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Abstract 
This paper provides international evidence for the effect of financialisation on the labour share 
at the firm level. We test different hypotheses about the impact of financialisation on functional 
income distribution, while also controlling for the effect of technological change, market 
concentration, labour market institutions and globalisation. We use panel data for publicly listed 
non-financial companies globally and with a particular focus on the EU15 for the period of 1995-
2016. We find a negative effect of financialisation on the labour share due to increased 
shareholder value orientation in all countries, while there is also evidence of a negative effect 
due to an increase in mark-ups in France and the UK. Additionally, our findings cast doubt on 
the hypotheses that the decline in the labour share in European publicly listed firms is due to 
technological change. Similarly, market concentration did not play an important role for the 
decline in the labour share. In contrast, we find that concentration has declined among publicly 
listed firms in Europe, and that concentration is not associated with declining labour shares. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a significant decline in the share of labour income in GDP in both developed 
and developing countries since the 1980s. Previous research has highlighted the impact of 
technological change, increasing market concentration, globalisation, and changes in labour 
market institutions to explain this phenomenon (Autor, et al. 2017; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 
2014; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; IMF, 2007; European Commission, 2007; Stockhammer, 
2017). However, during the same period we also witnessed surges in dividend payouts and 
share buybacks and an increasing engagement of non-financial corporations in financial 
activities. These trends are part of a broader development that is referred to as financialisation, 
defined by Epstein (2005, p. 3) as the ‘increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies’. Several authors suggested negative consequences for income distribution, but the 
theoretical arguments, and especially the empirical evidence, is underdeveloped.  
This is the first paper to provide cross-country evidence on the effect of financialisation on the 
labour share (labour compensation as a ratio to net value added) at the firm level.  
We test different hypotheses about the impact of financialisation on functional income 
distribution, while also controlling for the effect of technological change, market concentration, 
labour market institutions and globalisation using panel data for publicly listed non-financial 
companies (NFCs). Our focus lies on the EU151 and its largest member states (France, 
Germany, the UK and Sweden) for the period of 1995-2016, but we also conduct estimations 
for two country pools of advanced2 and emerging/ developing economies3. Alvarez (2015) is 
the only publication that investigates the effect of financialisation on the labour share using 
firm-level data for France. We go beyond this contribution, first, by considering more detailed 
mechanisms via which financialisation can affect the labour share, second, by testing the 
impact of alternative factors that affect the labour share and controlling for potential biases 
arising from endogeneity, and third, by providing cross-country evidence. 
The use of firm-level data has several advantages over country- and industry-level data, as used 
in the previous research. First, the financialisation argument implies a decline of the labour 
share within firms.4 Country- or industry-level data cannot distinguish changes in the aggregate 
labour share that are due to a change of labour shares within firms and a reallocation of 
production towards firms with lower labour shares. This opens the door for a fallacy of 
composition. Indeed, if the wage share declined due to a between firm reallocation as claimed 
by Autor et al. (2017), the connection to financialisation seems questionable. The second point 
relates to data availability and measurement. Previous research cannot distinguish between 
                                                 
1 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
2 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
3 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey. 
4 One exception is the argument by Hein (2015) that links financialisation to a change in the sectoral composition. 
However, this argument lacks empirical significance as the labour share declined mainly due to a change within 
industries, rather than due to changes in the industrial composition (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014).  
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publicly listed and non-listed firms, although theory mainly focuses on the former. 
Furthermore, previous macro-level studies could not convincingly control for the impact of 
technological change, because adequate measures are lacking at the macro level and because 
the effect is likely to be correlated with firm-specific characteristics. This can bias coefficients 
and render results unreliable. In contrast, panel estimations with firm-level data allow to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity between firms and more precise estimations. Lastly, data 
on financialisation at the country level is only available since the mid-1990s for a sufficient 
number of countries. Consequently, single country estimations using macro data are not 
reliable due to the short time dimension. Therefore, most studies revert to macro-panel 
estimations with little possibility to test the validity of the pooling assumption, i.e. without 
considering that the effect of financialisation might differ across countries. In contrast, we can 
obtain an exact measure of financial payments and financial income at the firm level, and test 
whether there is an effect based on single country estimations for the largest economies in our 
pool (France, Germany and the UK) before pooling all EU15 countries.  
We find that the labour share in European publicly listed firms mainly declined due to a within-
firm change, and that financialisation is a robust driver of this process. This confirms previous 
findings using country-level data and puts them on a more solid empirical footing 
(Stockhammer, 2017; Dünhaupt, 2016; Kohler, et al. 2018). Furthermore, we go beyond 
previous analyses, by testing three different channels via which financialisation can impact the 
labour share: 1) increased shareholder value orientation and consequent wage suppression, 2) 
increased financial overhead costs and consequent increases in the mark-up, 3) increased fall-
back options for capital due to a decoupling of profit generation from the core business 
activities. Our results suggest a negative effect of financialisation on the labour share due to 
increased shareholder value orientation in all countries, while there is also evidence for a 
negative effect due to an increase in mark-ups in some individual countries (France and the 
UK). We find no evidence for a negative effect due to increased fall-back options of capital in 
advanced economies in general or Europe in particular. However, we are the first to find 
evidence for a negative impact of increasing fall-back options of capital on the labour share in 
emerging/ developing economies. Additionally, our findings cast doubt on the hypotheses that 
the decline in the labour share in publicly listed firms is due to technological change. Similarly, 
market concentration did not play an important role for the decline in the labour share. In 
contrast, for the EU15 we find that concentration has declined and that concentration is not 
associated with declining labour shares. We also find no evidence for the effect of globalisation 
once financialisation is controlled for, although results can only be seen as indicative due 
limited data availability at the firm-level.  
In the next section we identify three key hypotheses in the theoretical literature on the 
determinants of the labour share: 1) The technological change hypothesis suggests that 
increasing substitution of capital for labour drives the decline in the labour share. 2) The 
bargaining power hypothesis sees the decline of the bargaining power of labour as the main 
explanatory factor. 3) The superstar firm hypothesis posits that the labour share declined 
because a small number of very productive firms grew faster than their competitors. We also 
review the existing evidence for these three hypotheses. Section 3 presents our data and 
descriptive statistics, with an in-depth analysis of the relevance of the superstar firm hypothesis 
for the EU15. Section 4 presents our estimation strategy and results, while Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Determinants of the labour share: different hypotheses 
 
There are three main hypotheses explaining the decline in the labour share: the technological 
change hypothesis, the bargaining power hypothesis and the superstar firm hypothesis. This 
section outlines the main channels and the necessary assumptions underlying these hypotheses. 
 
 2.1 The technological change hypothesis 
 
Main channel:  
The technological change hypothesis posits that the labour share declined due to capital 
augmenting technological change and/or an increase in the capital-output ratio. Several studies 
argue that technological progress was capital augmenting since the 1980s (Bassanini and 
Manfredi 2014; European Commission 2007). This increases the amount of output that can be 
produced from a given unit of capital and can have a negative impact on the labour share. A 
related stream of literature posits that technological progress in the last four decades 
contributed to a decline in the price of capital relative to labour. If firms are optimising, this 
will lead to a substitution of capital for labour and an increase in the capital-output ratio, 
referred to as capital intensity (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). The increase in capital 
intensity can also be driven by globalisation if firms in capital abundant countries offshore 
labour-intensive tasks to benefit from lower wages in labour abundant countries (IMF, 2017; 
Elsby, et al., 2013). These channels imply a change in labour share within firms. 
 
Main assumption:  
Indeed, under the assumption of fully competitive markets, optimising firms, and a 
differentiable production function the wage share can be expressed as a function of capital 
augmenting technological change and capital intensity alone (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). 
However, the effect of these two variables on the labour share depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour. More precisely, the necessary assumption for a 
negative effect of both factors is that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is 
larger than one. 
 
Evidence:  
Empirical evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive. Several empirical studies found a 
negative effect of technological change on the labour share (Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; European Commission, 2007; Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012; 
IMF, 2007, 2017). Most prominently, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) provide evidence for 
an elasticity of substitution above one and increasing capital intensity worldwide. According 
to their estimations, about half of the global decline in the labour share can be explained by a 
change in the relative price of capital. However, out of 13 studies that estimate the labour share 
with sector- or country-level data, seven found an elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour that is smaller or equal to one. 
5 
 
 
Table 1: Implied elasticity of substitution in selected papers 
 
Paper  Implied elasticity 
Bassanini & Manfredi (2014) e>1 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) e>1 
Doan and Wan (2017) e<1  
European Commission (2007) e<1 (K/L); e>1 (ICT)  
Elsby, et al. (2012) e=1 
Harrison (2002) e<1 
Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) e>1 
ILO (2011) e<1 
IMF (2007) e<=1 (K/L); Non-linear for ICT 
IMF (2017) e>=1 (relative price of capital); e>1 (TFP) 
Karabarbounis & Neiman 2014 e>1 
Stockhammer 2009 e=1 
Stockhammer 2016 e<=1 
Notes: If conflicting results are found the variables are indicated in in brackets. (K/L) = capital-output ratio; TFP 
= total factor productivity; ICT = ICT capital intensity; RI = relative price of capital. Results for IMF (2007) are 
based on estimations for the aggregate labour share using instrumental variables. They find evidence for an 
elasticity above one when they conduct estimations for high- and low-skilled sectors separately. 
 
More importantly, studies whose primary focus lies on the estimation of the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour consistently find values below one and closer to 0.4 
(Chirinko, 2008; Chirinko and Mallick, 2014).5  
 
2.2 The bargaining power hypothesis 
 
Main channel:  
The bargaining power hypothesis attributes the decline in the labour share to a decline in the 
bargaining power of labour. In models of bargaining power, capital and labour bargain for 
wages and potentially employment. Both parties have an interest in concluding the negotiations 
and the split of the value added depends on their fall-back options. However, the effect of an 
                                                 
5 Additionally, Barkai (2016) provides evidence that the decline in the labour share was accompanied by a decline 
in the capital share, measured as the capital stock to value added ratio evaluated at the competitive rate of return 
of capital. Income can be split into the labour share, the capital share and the profit share. Under the assumption 
of perfectly competitive markets economic profits are zero. Consequently, income is distributed among the factors 
exhaustively, i.e. a decline in the labour share implies an increase in the capital share. Barkai’s (2016) argument 
is the following: Since any change in the labour share that is induced by factor substitution implies a proportionate 
increase in the capital share, the only way to reconcile a simultaneous decline in both factor shares is a change in 
the profit share. Since we are not able to calculate a competitive rate of return for capital due to data availability, 
we are not able to distinguish between profit shares and capital shares in our empirical analysis. 
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increase in the bargaining power of labour on the labour share depends on the specific 
bargaining model. In models where unions bargain for wages and firms set employment 
unilaterally (e.g. ‘right-to-manage’ bargaining), an increase in wages will lead to a substitution 
of capital for labour. Consequently, increased bargaining power of labour only improves the 
labour share if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is smaller than one 
(Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Furthermore, such an effect will be reflected in changes in 
the capital intensity. If labour can bargain for wages as well as employment (e.g. models of 
efficiency bargaining), an increase in bargaining power will increase the labour share 
unambiguously (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). A third category are Kaleckian models of 
mark-up pricing (Kalecki, 1954, p. 18). In these models, workers can set the nominal wage 
while firms set prices, i.e. product markets as well as labour markets are not perfectly 
competitive. If unions manage to increase wages, firms respond by increasing prices, resulting 
in so-called conflict inflation (Rowthorn, 1977). However, since firms cannot increase prices 
indefinitely without losing their market share, an increase in labour’s bargaining power 
increases the labour share.6 Summing up, changes in bargaining power can impact factor 
distribution either by increasing the real wages (without reducing employment) or by changing 
the mark-up firms charge on production costs. All these channels imply a change in the labour 
share within firms.  
 
Main assumption:  
As soon as markets are not fully competitive, i.e. there is market power in the labour market 
and potentially the goods market, bargaining power between capital and labour becomes an 
additional variable that determines factor distribution.  
 
Specific channels and empirical evidence:  
Four main determinants of bargaining power have been highlighted in the literature: 
globalisation, labour market institutions, concentration and financialisation.  
 
Globalisation:  
Deregulation of trade barriers increases the mobility of capital by reducing relocation and 
offshoring costs (capital’s fall-back options) and thereby increases the credibility of the firing 
threat (Rodrik, 1998; Harrison, 2002). There is strong empirical evidence for a negative effect 
of globalisation on the labour share as captured by different measures of trade intensity, 
offshoring and foreign direct investment (FDI) (Elsby, et al., 2013; European Commission, 
2007; IMF 2007, 2017; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; Harrison, 2002; Hutchinson and Persyn, 
2012; Onaran, 2011, 2012; Stockhammer, 2017; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Jayadev, 
2007).  
 
Labour market institutions:  
However, the traditional focus of bargaining power models are labour market institutions 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). For example, an increase in unemployment benefits would 
                                                 
6 Note that Kaleckian models of mark-up pricing usually assume a zero or low elasticity of substitution. Therefore, 
firms respond to changes in wages by increasing prices rather than by factor substitution. 
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improve the fall-back options and thereby the bargaining power of workers. Studies estimating 
the effect of labour market institutions on labour share abound, but evidence is mixed. The 
European Commission (2007) finds a negative effect of unemployment benefits and 
employment protection legislation, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2007) reports 
a negative effect of unemployment benefits, and justifies this by a high elasticity of 
substitution. Stockhammer (2017), on the other hand, does not find statistically significant 
effects of labour market institutions. Conversely, evidence suggests more robust positive 
effects of direct measures of bargaining power such as union density (Stockhammer, 2009, 
2017; ILO, 2011; Guschanski and Onaran, 2017), strike activity (Kristal, 2010; Argitis and 
Pitelis, 2001; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003) and minimum wages (ILO, 2011; European 
Commission, 2007). 
 
Concentration:  
Most studies using country-level data find no impact of product market regulation, which is 
used as a proxy for the degree of competition, on the labour share (European Commission, 
2007; IMF, 2007). Recent studies use firm-level data to account for the effect of concentration 
on the mark-up and subsequently on the labour share. Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) document 
an increase in concentration in 13 European countries between 1991 and 2001. Subsequently, 
they estimate the effect of concentration on the labour share at the industry level. In their 
theoretical model an increase in concentration increases the mark-up which has an adverse 
effect on the labour share. However, in their regression analysis concentration is only included 
together with an estimate of the Lerner-index. Concentration is insignificant, which is not 
surprising if the Lerner index appropriately captures the mark-up and thus constitutes an 
intervening variable. However, the Lerner index is not robust in the longer sample and has a 
very small effect on the labour share in comparison to other variables. The authors do not, 
however, control for potential endogeneity between the labour share and their explanatory 
variables. Barkai (2016) documents an increase in concentration in the U.S. In this framework, 
concentration is treated as a result of decline in the degree of competition, and changes in 
market regulation are named as one plausible driver. Barkai (2016) then proceeds by providing 
empirical evidence for a negative correlation between increases in concentration and the wage 
at the industry level for the U.S., which is particularly prominent in non-tradable sectors. In 
combination with his analysis of changes in the capital share, his findings imply that the decline 
in the labour share in the U.S. is a result of an increase in the mark-up.7  
Lastly, an increase in concentration could also have a negative impact on the bargaining power 
of labour by reducing labour’s fall-back options. This is a labour demand argument: a reduction 
in the number of firms in a particular sector increases the monopsony power of large employers. 
This can be conceived as a reduction in workers’ fall-back options with adverse effects for the 
                                                 
7 Barkai (2016) does not conclusively identify the reason for the increase in concentration. Consequently, in 
contrast to other contributions discussed in this section, he is agnostic about whether the decline in the labour 
share is due to changes in the mark-up among the majority of firms or due to a reallocation of output towards 
firms with larger mark-ups. Barkai cites unpublished work by Peltzman (2014), who finds that industries in the 
US that experienced the strongest increases in concentration also experienced the strongest increase in prices, 
which indeed suggest an increase of mark-ups in the majority of firms and a decrease in the within-firm labour 
share. 
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labour share. Evidence for this hypothesis is scarce, but Azar, et al. (2017) show that labour 
market concentration (i.e. a reduction in the number of employers per geographic region) is 
negatively associated with posted wages in the U.S.   
 
Financialisation:  
This paper addresses financialisation as an important determinant of bargaining power which 
gained momentum since the 1980s and received only limited attention in the literature on 
functional income distribution. Focusing on the definition by Epstein (2005, p. 3, see Section 
1), we outline three sub-channels via which financialisation can impact the wage share: 1) the 
increasing role of financial motives for the management of non-financial corporations leads to 
wage suppression; 2) financial actors exert pressure on non-financial corporations, which leads 
to increasing overhead costs and increasing mark-ups; 3) financial markets offer an alternative 
source of profits and thereby increase the fall-back options of capital.8 
 
1) Financial Motives – the shareholder value channel: The first channel focuses on the 
corporate governance of publicly listed firms and is based on the emergence of shareholder 
value maximisation (SVM). The term derives from the corporate governance literature of the 
1980s which asserted that corporate managers (the agents) need to be controlled by 
shareholders (the principals), lest the former engage in activities that do not maximise value 
for the latter. More precisely, managers would focus on increasing the market share and size 
of their corporation as well as investing in the skill-base of their workforce, rather than 
maximise income for shareholders. The two major methods to align objectives of shareholders 
and managers are the ‘market for corporate control’ and linking managers’ remuneration to 
stock price performance (Jensen and Fama, 1983; Jensen et al. 1990). The former method relies 
on the stock price being a signal for the implications of internal decisions on current and future 
cash flows. Decisions that are not supported by shareholders will reduce the share price, 
thereby exposing the firm to the risk of a hostile takeover. However, while hostile takeovers 
were common up until the mid-1990s, the majority of takeovers now are of a ‘friendly’ nature 
(Admati, 2017:133). More precisely, firms found other means to protect themselves from the 
threat of hostile takeovers. Since then, shareholders have relied on the second channel, i.e. the 
creation of incentive structures that link managers’ remuneration to share price performance in 
the form of stock options or bonuses.  
How is shareholder value orientation linked to the labour share? Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) 
show that linking managers’ remuneration to share prices (via a higher ownership stake of 
managers) is associated with increases in total factor productivity. Bryan, et al. (2009) argue 
                                                 
8 Koehler, Guschanski and Stockhammer (2018) identify another mechanism by which financialisation can affect 
the labour share. Increasing financialisation of households, in particular the rise of household debt, may have 
increased the financial vulnerability of working class households (Langley, 2007). This may have weakened 
labour vis-à-vis capital. Testing this hypothesis at the firm level would require data on the indebtedness of 
employees which is not available. Wood (2017) finds a negative effect of mortgage debt in Great Britain and the 
USA, but no effect in Sweden and Denmark for the period 1979-2012. Guschanski and Onaran (2016) find a 
negative effect of household debt (measured at the country level) on sectoral wage shares in Austria, Great Britain, 
and the USA for the period 1970-2010. However, they do not find evidence in estimations with a pool of all 
countries, suggesting that the effect is country dependent. Kohler, et al. (2018) find no significant effect of 
household debt in a panel of 14 OECD countries.     
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that this increased productivity might be a result of increased work intensity. There is also a 
general argument that shareholder value maximisation led to a change in the management 
culture that unsettled a balance between stakeholders and shareholders that had been more 
favourable to workers. With the emergence of shareholder value maximisation the focus of 
managers shifted to the pursue of short-term gains and stock prices performance, by means of 
increased dividend payouts and share buybacks – referred to as the ‘downsize and distribute’ 
approach (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).9 Lazonick (2014) explicitly argues that excess 
profits from productivity gains in the last decades were used for share buybacks rather than 
wage increases, resulting in the divergence of real wages and productivity that underlies the 
decrease in the labour share. However, the argument is incomplete as it requires an explanation 
of why workers let it happen. Factors that explain the decline in workers’ bargaining power 
abide and range from declining union density to welfare state retrenchment and globalisations 
as outlined above. In this sense a decline in bargaining power is a necessary condition for a 
negative effect of shareholder value maximisation on the wage share, however, without 
shareholder value maximisation the wage share would have declined less. Put differently, 
shareholder value maximisation reduces prospects for labour to agree on a beneficial 
compromise but requires a decline in the bargaining power of labour to be fully effective. 
Kohler et al. (2018) are the only study to explicitly investigate this mechanism in a macro-
panel estimation of 14 OECD countries. They find a negative, but not robust effect of 
shareholder value orientation and specifically short-termism on the labour share, as captured 
by the stock market turnover ratio.  
 
2) Financial actors – the mark-up channel: The second channel analyses the effect of 
shareholder value maximisation on the labour share via the product market. The argument is 
usually framed in the tradition of Kaleckian (1969) mark-up pricing models. In these models, 
firms do not possess full knowledge of their production function and therefore base their 
pricing decision on average unit costs rather than marginal costs, i.e. they take overhead costs 
into account. As average unit costs decline with the level of output, the pricing decision will 
be based on some ‘normal’ output level. This is referred to as normal cost pricing (Lavoie, 
2014, chapter 3).10 Hein (2015), referring to Kalecki (1969, pp. 17-18), maintains that increased 
financial payments (i.e. interest and dividend payments) will increase the mark-up firms charge 
on their products, as such payments are considered overhead costs from the perspective of 
firms. Financialisation has led to an increase in financial payments due to shareholder value 
orientation. A rise in the mark-up due to increased financial overhead costs will increase prices, 
reduce real wages and thereby increase the profit share. Notably, this mechanism relies on two 
assumptions: First, firms must possess the power to raise the mark-up in response to an increase 
in overhead costs. Second, interest payments must rise for reasons linked to financialisation, 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, this process is not necessarily to the benefit of the shareholders. Indeed, due to similar information 
asymmetries that provided the ground for the principal-agent problem that led to the emergence of shareholder 
value maximisation, managers can now engage in activities that increase share prices but harm the long-term 
prospects of the corporations (Admati, 2017). 
10 This clearly deviates from models of marginalist pricing. As another important difference, in this literature the 
mark-up is determined by the degree of monopoly, which is function of market concentration, product 
substitutability and the bargaining power between capital and labour (Hein, 2014), rather than the price elasticity 
of demand alone as in the basic neoclassical models of imperfect competition. 
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such as an increase in the interest rate due to increased power of rentiers or because firms take 
on debt to finance share buybacks (the latter is suggested by Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
However, interest payments are only partly under the control of the firm. Furthermore, if firms 
take on debt to finance productive investment, interest payments could be associated with an 
expansion of production and have a positive impact on the labour share.  
This argument has motivated four econometric studies. Hein and Schoder (2011) estimate an 
autoregressive distributed lag model for the USA and Germany between 1963 and 2007 and 
report a weakly significant (at the 10% level) positive impact of net interest payments on the 
profit share. Dünhaupt (2016) regresses the wage share on net dividend and interest payments 
of non-financial corporations using a panel of 13 OECD countries over the period 1986-2007. 
She finds a strong and statistically significant negative impact of dividend payments, whereas 
the coefficient on interest payments is negative but statistically insignificant. Kohler, et al. 
(2018) find a negative impact of net financial payments in a panel of 14 OECD countries over 
the 1992-2014 period. Alvarez (2015) is the only study that investigates the effect of 
financialisation on the labour share using firm-level data for France. He finds a negative impact 
of interest payments; however, his empirical model has several identification issues. First, by 
including employment, profits, sales and value added simultaneously as explanatory variables, 
his estimations should be interpreted as an analysis of wages rather than the labour share. 
Second, his dependent variable is labour compensation as a ratio to total assets rather than value 
added. His explanatory variables turn insignificant once he changes his denominator to value 
added, which potentially is the related to the use of profits and employment as explanatory 
variables. Third, he does not control for endogeneity of his explanatory variables, so that his 
results might be driven by a simultaneity bias. 
 
3) Financial markets – the financial profits channel: The majority of previous studies focused 
on the negative effects of shareholder value maximisation on the accumulation of fixed assets 
due to the attractiveness of short-term financial gains at the expense of long-term investment 
(Tori and Onaran, 2017; 2018). The growth in the share of profits of financial subsidiaries of 
non-financial corporations, such as General Motors, Ford, General Electric, and Sears is well 
documented for the US (Lin and Tomascovic-Devey, 2013; Lazonick, 2014). This provides the 
basis for the third channel of the effect of financialisation on functional income distribution. A 
decoupling of profits from core business activities constitutes an improvement in the fall-back 
options of capital relative to labour, with potentially negative effects for the labour share (Lin 
and Tomascovic-Devey, 2013). Rather than agreeing to wage demands of the workforce, the 
manager can decide to outsource or close the relevant part of the production process and engage 
in financial activities. Similarly, it decreases the leverage of labour: For example, if a strike is 
organised in the main business sector, the company continues making profits in the financial 
division. Conversely, a relaxation of the budget constraint due to financial profits can make 
bargaining outcomes that are more favourable to labour more likely. Simply put, if there is 
more income, capital could be more willing to make concessions to labour. Consequently, a-
priori the effect of financial income on the labour share is not clear cut. Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey (2013) and Alvarez (2015) investigate this hypothesis using US sector-level and French 
firm-level data respectively. Both find a negative effect of financial income on the wage share, 
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while controlling for variables measuring technological change and globalisation. In contrast, 
Kohler, et al. (2018) find no effect of financial income in a panel of 14 OECD countries.11 
 
2.3 The superstar firm hypothesis 
  
Main channel:  
The superstar firm hypothesis links the declining labour share to an increase in market 
concentration. However, in contrast to contributions focusing on bargaining power, the 
transmission channel does not rely on changes in the mark-up. Rather, concentration arises 
because a small number of very productive (superstar) firms grow much fast than their 
competitors. These firms are characterised by lower labour shares, either because of scale 
effects or because their productivity grows much faster than wages.  
 
Main assumption:  
All previously discussed channels assume a decline of the labour share within firms. The 
superstar firm hypothesis implies that the main reason for the decline in the aggregate labour 
share is a reallocation of production towards firms with low labour shares. This is referred to 
as the ‘between effect’ and will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.  
 
Specific channels and empirical evidence:  
Contributions to this literature differ mainly by the mechanism that is leading to an increase in 
concentration. In the model by Autor et al. (2017) a positive shock to the price elasticity of 
demand leads to an increased share of output being produced by highly productive firms.12 
Since the labour share consists of fixed overhead labour costs and variable costs, it is decreasing 
in firm size. Consequently, the labour share is increasing in the majority of firms (due to an 
increase in the competitive pressure and a decline in the mark-up), while it is decreasing in 
high productive (superstar) firms due to decreasing overhead labour as a ratio to output. 
Interestingly, in contrast to approaches highlighting changes in bargaining power, this model 
posits that increasing concentration is a result of an increase in competitive pressure (captured 
by the price elasticity of demand) rather than a decrease in competition as in Barkai (2016). 
The empirical analysis relies mainly on U.S. Economic Census data and contains three main 
insights. First, concentration increased in the U.S. Second, the labour share declined due to 
reallocation towards low-labour share firms rather than a decline of the labour share within 
                                                 
11 A related stream of literature argues that financial liberalisation during the 1980s and 1990s and thus higher 
international capital mobility increases the exit options of capital. While the financial income argument implies a 
shift from the core business of the firm towards financial services, the deregulation of capital flows enabled firms 
to relocate production abroad and is thus similar to the effect of offshoring. Several studies investigate this 
hypothesis using country level data and find a negative effect of financial globalisation on the labour share (see 
Kohler, et al., 2018, for a review of this literature). In a different argument, IMF (2017) has linked financial 
globalisation to changes in the relative prices price of capital with subsequent impact on the labour share in line 
with the technological change hypothesis. Diwan (1999) finds that the labour share is negatively affected by 
banking and exchange rate crises, indicating that labour is forced to bear the bulk of the costs. In so far as financial 
crises became more frequent and more widespread with the increase in financial openness and international 
financial flows, this channel provides another link between financial globalisation and the labour share.  
12 However, the authors also discuss alternative reasons for such a reallocation of production, including barriers 
to entry and network effects. 
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firms. Third, there is a negative bi-variate correlation between the increase in concentration 
and the between-firm decline of the labour share. This correlation is observed at the sector 
level, calculated by aggregating the firm-level data to a narrow industry classification. 
However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive. Author et al. (2017) obtain less 
economically significant and less robust correlations between concentration and the labour 
share for manufacturing sectors in comparison to service sectors, although the former suffer 
less from measurement errors. Further, like the other contributions in this literature stream, 
they do not control for other variables but rather only look at correlations between their two 
variables of interest. 
Autor, et al. (2017) is the only paper that provides international evidence for the superstar firm 
hypothesis. Using the CompNet database (Lopez-Garcia, et al., 2015) they show a correlation 
between 5- and 10-year changes in the sales ratio of the 10 largest firm in a 2-digit NACE 
sector and the labour share. Furthermore, they provide a shift-share analysis of the aggregate 
wage share decline based on the Orbis database – a firm-level dataset that contains non-listed 
as well as publicly listed firms. A shift-share analysis allows to decompose changes in the 
aggregate labour share into changes of the labour shares within firms (within component) and 
changes due to a reallocation of output towards firms with lower labour shares (between 
component). According to this decomposition, the between component dominates the decline 
in the aggregate labour share in the UK (2003-2008), Germany, Italy and Portugal (2003-2010) 
while it has the same magnitude as the effect from exiting firms in France (2003-2008). The 
within component dominates the decline in Sweden. However, this finding might be driven by 
the short time period considered which also includes the first year of the Great Recession, 
during which labour shares increased across the board within firms, thereby seemingly reducing 
the contribution of the within component. 
The relevance of the between component for the decline in the labour share in the US is also 
confirmed by other studies. Hartman, et al. (2016) analyse the labour share of publicly listed 
firms in the US using the Compustat database. In their model the increase in concentration is a 
result of increasing firm-level revenue volatility, which leads to the emergence of some very 
productive firms while the others stay behind.13 Kehring and Vincent (2017) provide an 
empirical analysis that stays agnostic about the reason for the increase in concentration. Like 
Autor, et al. (2017) they use census data for U.S. manufacturing firms. Interestingly, their 
findings highlight the relevance of the decline in the labour share within superstar firms. More 
precisely, they document that ⅓ of the decline in the aggregate labour share is due to the 
reallocation of sales between firms, ⅙ is due to the exit of plants with a higher-than-average 
labour share, while ½ of the decline is explained by plants that grow and decrease their labour 
share simultaneously. Furthermore, they show that labour shares in superstar firms declined 
                                                 
13 The intuition behind this mechanism is that increased revenue volatility lowers the threshold of a minimum 
level of productivity that is required for a firm to continue production. If revenues are highly volatile, even a firm 
with previously low revenues can suddenly become highly profitable, which in turn reduces the exit rate of firms. 
This reduction in the rate of exiting firms allows for the emergence of a few very productive firms, while the 
lower tail of highly unproductive (low revenue) firms grows as well. Wages are determined ex ante, i.e. before 
productivity is known. Consequently, the wage share declines in highly productive firms, whereas it increases in 
those ‘unlucky’ firms that never achieve a high level of productivity. They show that under certain conditions the 
aggregate wage share will always decline due to this process and that the decline will take place via a change in 
the size distribution of firms. 
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because of an increase in value added while employment remained constant, suggesting a key 
role for productivity to explain the decline of superstar firms’ labour share, in line with Autor, 
et al. (2017) and Hartman, et al. (2016).  
Other contributions cast doubt on the link between productivity and concentration. For 
example, Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) provide evidence that concentration is negatively 
linked to productivity in the U.S. since the beginning of the 1990s and most likely a result of 
decreased competition. Lastly, size effects are not the only potential reason for a decline in the 
labour share in superstar firms. First, as also mentioned by Autor, et al. (2017), firms with a 
larger market share might be able to impose higher mark-ups. Second, as discussed in Section 
2.2 concentration can lead to a decline in labour’s fall-back options. However, such aspects of 
bargaining power are usually ignored in the ‘superstar firm’ literature. 
 
2.4 Summary  
Summing up, we have identified three key hypotheses that offer an explanation for the decline 
in the labour share. First, the technological change hypothesis implies that changes in relative 
prices induced substitution of capital for labour which led to an increase in the capital-output 
ratio. This process was supported by capital-augmenting technological change and the 
offshoring of labour intensive tasks abroad. This hypothesis relies on the assumption of an 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour that is larger than one. Second, the 
bargaining power hypothesis focuses on a change in industrial relations. Fall back options of 
labour declined as labour markets became more flexible and bargaining institutions like trade 
unions eroded. While organisational power of labour dwindled, managers, motivated by 
shareholder value maximisation, adopted a corporate governance strategy that is more hostile 
towards wage increases and prioritises dividend payouts and share buybacks. An alternative 
channel highlights increasing financial payments due to financialisation. Rather than accepting 
profit cuts, managers shifted the burden of increased financial payments on consumers by 
increasing the mark-up on production costs. Another channel highlights that fall-back options 
of capital increased due to the possibility to invest in financial assets rather than productive 
activities. Both the technological change and the bargaining power hypothesis imply a decline 
in the labour share within firms. Third, the superstar firm hypothesis posits that the decline of 
the aggregate labour share results from a reallocation of production towards extremely 
productive firms with low labour shares. This process is argued to be linked to increasing 
competition and increasing cash flow volatility at the firm-level.  
 
 
3. Data, descriptive statistics and a test of the superstar firm hypothesis  
 
Our sample consists of active publicly listed companies in 50 advanced and emerging/ 
developing economies, supplied by Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope database.14 It provides 
annual information on standard accounting items such as employment, compensation, and 
                                                 
14 Our focus on active firms is based on data reliability concern. Firm level data are characterised by large outliers 
for firms shortly before their bankruptcy or merger, which are events not related to the effects we want to test. 
Furthermore, data for active firms is more reliable as it is more frequently controlled by the data analysts at 
Thomson Reuters.  
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capital stock, as well as financial income and payments. While the database is widely used in 
the literature on investment (Bond, et al. 2003; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Tori and Onaran 
2017; 2018), this is the first paper to the best of our knowledge to employ it to analyse 
functional income distribution. Its main advantage lies in international comparability, which is 
assured by adjusting accounting variables for differences in presentation and disclosure.15 
Nevertheless, national accounting systems differ in important ways, which cannot be factored 
out, such as the calculation of depreciation and the utilisation of accruals and provisions. 
Therefore, we prefer analyses at the national level, if this is feasible given the number of 
available companies per country. As the second-best option, we present detailed analysis at the 
EU15 level, which is the economic area for which we have the largest number of observations 
and there is more regulatory convergence.16   
Our sample differs from datasets used in the firm-level analysis in the literature on the USA in 
two important ways: first, in contrast to Autor et al. (2017), Barkai (2016), and Vincent and 
Kehring (2016), we do not have information on non-listed companies. Since our focus lies on 
the hypotheses outlined by the financialisation literature, which apply to non-financial publicly 
listed companies, this is not a major concern. For the same reason we exclude financial and 
real estate companies from the sample.17 Another distinguishing characteristic of this database 
is that it reports consolidated balance sheets. Given that a large share of firms, especially 
publicly listed companies, operate in different countries, this allows us to obtain a more 
comprehensive picture of the within-firm distribution of their value added in global markets. 
More specifically, consolidated accounts capture all activities within the multinational 
corporation, including the relocation of production. For example, if a firm relocates tasks to an 
affiliate in order to benefit from lower wages abroad, this will be reflected in an overall decline 
in the firm-level labour share in our data, as long as the relocated activity is conducted within 
a subsidiary of the firm. Such processes cannot be captured with data from national accounts 
which is limited to domestic production only. However, the use of consolidated balance sheets 
and the limitation to publicly listed NFCs implies that we capture only a limited part of a 
countries’ value added18, and our dataset does not necessarily reflect the development of the 
aggregate labour share in a particular country. Nevertheless, as illustrated in Table 2, the firms 
                                                 
15 More precisely, Thomson Reuters reconstructs the balance sheets of companies based on a common definition 
of variables –e.g. the item ‘net sales’ is always reported net of excise taxes (Thomson Reuters, 2013). 
16 The low number of firms available for the USA is due to accounting rules by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), which does not oblige firms to disclose staff costs as separate item in operating expenses 
(Tracy, 2008). Consequently, the labour share can only be constructed for ca. 13% of publicly traded firms 
(Hartman, et al., 2016). Of those firms, an even smaller share reports staff costs for five consecutive years, 
rendering an econometric analysis of the US individually impossible.  
17 Furthermore, we exclude firms operating in agriculture and mining industries, as value added for these 
companies will fluctuate significantly with changes in commodity prices, as well as firms that are part of the 
public administration sector, as labour share dynamics in these firms will not be driven by the channels under 
consideration. This is a typical procedure in industry-level studies (e.g. Guschanski and Onaran, 2017). 
18 Furthermore, we cannot capture firms that enter or exit the market in a reliable way. Given that our dataset 
excludes delisted or bankrupt firms, our panel is characterised by a large share of entrants, i.e. firms that were 
listed between 1996 and 2016 and a smaller share of exiters, i.e. firms for which data is not available for more 
recent sample years. Theoretically, there should be no exiters in our sample since it is constrained to active 
companies. However, financial accounts data is not always immediately updated, so that the number of missing 
observations increases in more recent years. For a similar argument that applies to the Orbis firm database, see 
Autor et al. (2017: 43) 
15 
 
in our sample employ a large workforce in relation to the country of their headquarters, and 
consequently the analysis of their income distribution is relevant in itself.19   
 
Table 2: Employment share of our sample  
Min Max Mean Number of firms  
United Kingdom 0.15 0.31 0.23 1065 
France 0.16 0.38 0.28 574 
Germany 0.10 0.18 0.15 598 
Sweden 0.17 0.37 0.28 404 
Notes: Columns 2-4 show the number of employees in our sample as a ratio to aggregate employment by country 
over the period 1995-2014. Data reports the maximum, minimum and average value over the 1995-2014 period. 
The denominator is based on industry level data from EU KLEMS (Jäger, 2016), which ends in 2014. Aggregate 
values in the denominator exclude the following sectors that are also excluded from the firm-level database: 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; and 
Public Administration and Defence.   
 
Worldscope provides data from 1980 onwards, but coverage for earlier years is very limited, 
especially for financial variables; therefore we start our sample in 1995. For the wage bill at 
the firm level we use data on staff costs, which includes wages as well as all employee benefits 
such as health insurance and contributions to pension plans. Unfortunately, we are not able to 
adjust the wage bill for the income of self-employed workers. For example, services performed 
by consultants and contractors, who can be hired for several years but legally operate as self-
employed, are not part of the staff costs measure. However, this practice is mainly observed in 
the financial sector, which is excluded from our sample. We take the ratio of staff costs to the 
sum of staff costs and operating income, which is net sales minus operating expenses. 
Operating expenses include, among other costs, depreciation and amortisation. This accounts 
for two arguments raised in previous research. The first argument states that the decline of the 
labour share is less pronounced if depreciation is accounted for. The second argument is that 
depreciation has to be subtracted from value added if the labour share is to be interpreted as a 
measure of income distribution (Rognlie, 2015; Bridgman, 2017).20  
Figure 1 plots the aggregate labour share for the UK, France, Germany, Sweden, the EU15 
pool, the advanced economies pool and the emerging/ developing economies pool. The series 
is normalised to be equal to one in 1995 for better comparability and because level differences 
are difficult to interpret as they could stem from differences in the availability of firms from 
different sectors. We observe a decline in all samples between 1995 and 2007, albeit some 
upward movement in between, most remarkably in Sweden. In all countries the labour share 
increases sharply between 2008 and 2009 due to the Great Recession before it starts falling 
again in 2010. Since 2011 it shows an increasing trend in all groups except the advanced 
economies pool where it continues to decline. Notably, as of 2016 the wage share is lower than 
in 1995 in France, Germany, the EU15 and the advanced economies pool, but higher in the 
UK, Sweden and the emerging/ developing economies pool. For the UK the increase of the 
                                                 
19 Note since our variables are consolidated, employment in our sample includes employment outside the country 
of residence. Consequently, Table 2 aims at highlighting the relevance of our sample in terms of employment, 
rather than a measure of the country share of employment in publicly listed firms.   
20 Other contributions, however, opposed this view based on the argument that depreciation patterns are rather 
driven by the business cycle than long-term structural changes (Schwellnus, et al., 2017).  
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labour share since 2009 is in line with the observation that productivity has been particularly 
stagnant in the aftermath of the Great Recession. However, since data is lacking for many 
companies for the last 2 years of our sample, such aggregate measure can only be seen as 
indicative for recent years.  
 
Figure 1: Aggregate labour share in the EU15 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. Labour share in 1995 is set to 1. 
 
Figure 1, continued: Aggregate labour share in advanced and emerging/ developing economies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. Labour share in 1995 is set to 1. 
 
Next, we look at descriptive evidence for the main hypotheses under consideration. We mainly 
focus on the superstar firm hypothesis as it is increasingly gaining prominence in the literature. 
Furthermore, we cannot capture this hypothesis satisfactorily in our regression analysis in 
Section 4.2: according to the superstar firm hypothesis, an increase in concentration implies 
declining labour shares in superstar firms, while labour shares would increase or stay constant 
in other firms. Therefore, it is not clear whether we would expect a positive or a negative effect 
of this variable on the labour share. Consequently, we must rely on a more descriptive analysis 
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to assess the validity of this hypothesis.21 However, by including a measure of industry-level 
market concentration in our regression analysis, we can account for the hypothesis that an 
increase in concentration led to an increase in the labour share within firms across all firms, as 
suggested by mark-up pricing models. After an analysis of market concentration, we continue 
by looking at the bargaining power and technological change hypothesis. 
 
The superstar firm literature implies three testable hypotheses: 1) concentration has increased, 
2) the decline in the labour share is due to between-firm reallocation, 3) there is a negative 
correlation between the increase in concentration and the decline in the labour share. Previous 
research has examined them mainly for the U.S., and our contribution is to provide evidence 
for Europe. Our measure of concentration differs in two important ways from the previous 
contributions. First, using consolidated balance sheets allows to calculate concentration 
measures that take international sales into account. Given that many firms, and especially large 
publicly listed companies, compete on the global scale, concentration measures limited to the 
domestic market might be a misleading representation of the actual degree of market power. 
However, for some firms (especially in service industries) the domestic market might be a more 
relevant reference. Unfortunately, we cannot exclude international sales from our concentration 
measure due to limited data coverage. Second, we can only measure changes in concentration 
among publicly listed firms, i.e. we are unable to capture an increase in concentration between 
non-listed and listed companies. While this is a caveat, Grullon, Larkin and Michaely (2016) 
argue that the increase in concentration was driven by a small share of publicly listed firms, 
which suggest that we should be able to find evidence of this process using our data. To further 
account for this, we consider data from the CompNet database supplied by the European 
Central Bank (Lopez-Garcia, et al., 2015). The database collects information on non-financial 
companies, including listed- and non-listed firms, and aggregates them into sectors in order to 
ensure anonymity. For measures of concentration it covers 57,824 firms in France and 25,978 
in Germany on average across all sectors in a given year. The UK and Sweden are not part of 
the database.22 Table 3 reports the number of sectors that experienced a decline in concentration 
as a ratio to total number of sectors.  
  
                                                 
21 Another option would be to aggregate our firm-level data and conduct estimations at the industry level. 
However, the loss of information implied by this aggregation seems unjustified because the main focus of this 
analysis is financialisation, which we are particularly interested in examining at the firm level, as explained in 
Section 1.  
22 We regard this database as complementary to our sample of exclusively publicly listed firms, although it comes 
with its own drawbacks. Specifically, for France only firms with more than 750,000 euros of sales are included in 
the sample, whereas in Germany there is a bias towards large manufacturing firms. As recommended by the 
providers we rely on the E20 database whenever possible, which is an adapted version covering only firms with 
20 or more employees. Additionally, the E20 version uses re-weighting techniques to increase its 
representativeness with respect to the total population (CompNet, 2016, p. 12). 
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Table 3: Shares of sector with a decline in concentration  
 
Measure Top4-sales share Herfindahl-Index Top10-sales share 
Database Worldscope CompNet 
Country EU15 EU15 Germany France 
2000-
2007   31/44 27/53 
2000-
2012   23/44 21/53 
1995-
2007 29/35 31/35   
1995-
2015 28/35 30/35   
 
Using the Worldscope database of publicly listed firms, we observe that concentration 
increased only in a small share of sectors in the sample of all EU15 countries, as can be seen 
in Table 3. This trend is mirrored at the individual country level in all EU15 member states.23 
Turning to the CompNet database, we find no significant increase in concentration for 
Germany and France. For the period of 2001-2007 concentration declined in 70% of all sectors 
in Germany, while it declined in 51% of all sectors in France. For the 2001-2012 period the 
figures are 40% in France and 52% in Germany. Given that sectors differ by size, Figure 2 
provides data on the sales of the 10 largest firms in each sector weighted by the sector’s 
contribution to total sales. This aggregate series confirms a decreasing trend of concentration 
measures in Germany and France. Our finding of declining concentration in Europe is in line 
with the evidence provided by Gutierrez and Philippon (2017), which contrasts with findings 
by Hutchinson and Persyn (2012) who look at a different time period (1991-2005) and include 
listed and non-listed firms. 
 
Figure 2: Top10 firms’ sales share (CR10)  
Notes: Graphs show sales of the largest 10 firms in each sector as a ratio to total sales. Data is based on the 
CompNet database (Lopez-Garcia, et al., 2015). 
 
                                                 
23 Results are available upon request. 
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Next, we compute correlations between the sector level concentration and the labour share. We 
use long-term differences for two sub-periods, 2001-2007 and 2001-2012, in order to account 
for structural changes after the Great Recession. We rely on data from Thomson Reuters for 
the EU15 and data from CompNet for France and Germany. Table 4 reports the results. 
 
Table 4: Correlation between labour share and concentration (long-differences) 
EU15 
 measure correlation 95% limits 
1995-2007 HHI 0.339 -0.136 0.687 
1995-2007 CR4 0.379 -0.091 0.711 
1995-2015 HHI 0.150 -0.326 0.566 
1995-2015 CR4 0.361 -0.112 0.700 
Germany 
 measure correlation 95% limits 
2001-2007 HHI 0.005 -0.303 0.312 
2001-2007 CR10 0.047 -0.265 0.349 
2001-2012 HHI -0.138 -0.427 0.177 
2001-2012 CR10 -0.031 -0.335 0.279 
France 
 measure correlation 95% limits 
2001-2007 HHI -0.584 -0.742 -0.365 
2001-2007 HHI (excluding water transport) -0.088 -0.36 0.198 
2001-2012 CR10 -0.263 -0.504 0.017 
2001-2012 HHI -0.44 -0.64 -0.184 
2001-2007 CR10 -0.205 -0.457 0.078 
Notes: Data for the EU15 is based on the Worldscope database. Data for France and Germany is based on 
CompNet. HHI stands for the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. CR4 and CR10 stands for the sales ratio of the largest 
4 and 10 firms respectively. The table reports correlations between long-difference of the variables for the periods 
in column 1.  
 
Correlation coefficients for the EU15 and Germany are never significantly different from zero, 
while we do find a negative correlation between the change in the Herfindahl index and the 
labour share for France during 2001-2007. However, this result appears to be entirely driven 
by 1 sector (water transport), which is relatively small in terms of its value added to the total 
economy. If this sector is excluded the correlation is statistically insignificant. If the whole 
period (2001-2012) is considered, there is evidence for a negative correlation between the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the labour share in France. However, this is not confirmed 
for the CR10 measure, which is the more accurate measure of the rise of ‘superstar firms’. 
Furthermore, it appears to be driven entirely by the period after the Great Recession, which 
suggests that the increase in concentration might be a result of exiting firms rather than growing 
industry leaders.  
Lastly, the superstar firm hypothesis implies that the decline in the labour share is mainly 
driven by the between component, i.e. a reallocation of output towards firms with lower labour 
shares. In Table 5 we report a shift-share decomposition (Baily, et al., 1992) for our data in 
order to distinguish between- and within-firm changes in the aggregate labour share. We focus 
on surviving firms, i.e. firms that report data in the first and last year of the period under 
20 
 
consideration since data on exit and entry is not reliable.24 We constrain the sample until 2015 
in order to mitigate dynamics that are mainly due to missing data in the last year.  
 
Table 5: Shift-share decomposition of the decline in the aggregate labour share 
  ∆Labour share Within effect Between effect Covariance 
The UK 1995-2007 -0.037 -0.005 -0.030 -0.001 
 1995-2015 
0.090 0.188 0.004 -0.102 
France 1995-2007 -0.179 -0.173 -0.029 
0.023 
 1995-2015 
-0.073 -0.087 -0.014 0.027 
Germany 1995-2007 
-0.214 -0.199 0.009 -0.024 
 1995-2015 
-0.143 -0.261 0.002 0.115 
EU15 1995-2007 -0.149 -0.124 -0.021 -0.004 
 1995-2015 
-0.039 -0.040 0.004 -0.003 
Notes: Data based on Worldscope database 
 
In Germany, France and the EU15 almost all the decline in the labour share is explained by 
within firm variation for the period 1995-2007, while the between component and the 
covariance term are of similar magnitude. The contrary holds for the UK, where the between 
component explains the largest part of the labour share decline. Interestingly, the picture 
changes when the whole sample period (1995-2015) is considered. While the within component 
gains significance in all countries, the between component loses significance in the UK and the 
EU15, while it stays almost constant in France and Germany. Similarly, the covariance term 
indicates changes in the opposite direction of actual changes in the wage share in all countries 
except the EU15 sample, although the effect is quite large in some countries for the full 
period.25  
Overall, descriptive analysis suggests a limited increase in concentration, and a low correlation 
between changes in concentration and the labour share in European publicly listed firms. 
                                                 
24 Otherwise a large share of the change in the aggregate labour share would be explained by entering firms in the 
early years of the sample and exiting firms in later years. See Autor et al. (2017) for a similar argument for the 
Orbis database. Sweden is excluded from the analysis because of the small sample size. Constraining data to 
‘surviving’ firms results in a sample of 47 firms for the 1995-2007 period and 32 firms for the 1995-2015 period, 
which cannot be considered representative. However, for this small sample the within-firm component dominates 
the between component. 
25 The covariance term reflects a joint effect of the within and between components. This can be interpreted as 
follows: for the EU15, 7% (or 0.3 %-points) of the decline in the aggregate labour share between 1995-2015 is 
explained by a relocation of output towards low labour share firms that also decreased their labour share in the 
same period. However, this is only one possible interpretation. A more thorough analysis involving different 
decomposition techniques would be necessary to pin down the exact changes. Given that the covariance term has 
a modest impact for the pre-2007 period, which we consider as more representative of the long-run trend than the 
whole sample including the Great Recession, this is beyond the scope of this research.  
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Furthermore, changes in the labour share are mainly driven by a decline within firms. This cast 
doubt on the validity of the superstar firm hypothesis for the EU15 and suggests a potential 
role for those hypotheses that rely on a decline of the within-firm labour share, namely the 
technological change and the bargaining power hypothesis.  
 
However, a look at total fixed capital stock as a ratio to value added indicates a declining or U-
shaped pattern in the majority of countries in our sample (Figure 3). It would be desirable to 
analyse the evolution of information and communication technology (ICT) capital or intangible 
assets, as different types of capital can potentially have different elasticities of substitution with 
respect to labour. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to lack of data. Analysis at the industry 
level indeed suggest an increasing trend for ICT capital (Guschanski and Onaran, 2017) and 
intangible assets (Corrado, et al. 2012), which are more appropriate measures for the recent 
pattern of technological change in the post-1980s. However, the share of ICT in value added 
and intangibles as a ratio to total capital stock is still very small (Crouzet and Eberly, 2017; 
Guschanski and Onaran, 2017)26 and evidence for the US suggests it is growing too slowly to 
affect the general trend (Barkai, 2016). 
 
Figure 3: Net fixed capital stock as a ratio to value added in the EU15 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. Capital intensity in 1995 is set to 1. 
 
                                                 
26 In the sample of 14 OECD countries used in Guschanski and Onaran (2017) which is based on the EU KLEMS 
database (Jäger, 2016), the ICT capital stock as a ratio to total capital stock rarely exceeds 10%.  
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Figure 3, continued: Net fixed capital stock as a ratio to value added in advanced and emerging/ 
developing economies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. Capital intensity in 1995 is set to 1. 
 
Lastly, Figure 4 presents the evolution of net financial payments, i.e. dividend and interest 
payment minus dividend and interest income, as a ratio to the capital stock.  
 
Figure 4: Net financial payments as a ratio to net capital in the EU15 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. 
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Figure 4, continued: Net financial payments as a ratio to net capital in advanced and emerging/ 
developing economies 
 
Source: Own calculations based on Worldscope database. 
 
All countries show an increasing trend of net financial payments as a ratio to the net capital 
stock. The trend of this variable is mainly driven by increasing dividend payments. Indeed, 
interest payments decline in most countries, due to declining interest rates during the period 
under consideration.  
Summing up, the increase in dividend payments is in line with the financialisation channels 
outlined in Section 2, while declining capital intensity and concentration provides weak 
evidence for the superstar firm hypothesis for the EU15 and technological change hypothesis 
for all countries. Given that the aggregate labour share of publicly listed firms declined mainly 
due to a decline within firms, the next section tests in more detail the hypotheses that offer an 
explanation of within-firm changes in the labour share, namely the technological change and 
the bargaining power, with a particular focus on financialisation. 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
 
4.1 Model and estimation method 
In order to test the different channels outlined in Section 2 we estimate the following equation:  
 
ܮ ௜ܵ,௧ = ߙଵܮ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ + ߙଶܩܴܱܹܶܪ௜,௧ + ߙଷܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ ܫܰܶܧܰܵܫܶ ௜ܻ,௧ +  ߙସܨܫܰܣܰܥܫܣܮܫܵܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ + ߝ௜,௧   
  
where LS is the labour share in firm i, measured as staff costs as a ratio to value added. We 
include GROWTH, measured as the logarithmic change in real value added, to account for the 
counter-cyclicality of the wage share, which is due to the fact that profits decline in recessions, 
while wage incomes are more stable due to fixed-term wage contracts and overhead labour 
costs (Kalecki, 1954). It can also be justified as capturing adjustment costs in the process of 
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hiring and firing of workers (Bentolila & Saint-Paul, 2003). CAPITAL INTENSITY, our main 
measure of technological change, is captured by the net capital stock as a ratio to value added.27  
We include three measures of FINANCIALISATION – financial income, calculated as the sum 
of interest and dividend income received, and separate variables for interest payments and 
dividend payments. Financial income accounts for increases in fall-back options of capital and 
there is no theoretical reason to distinguish between the two sources of income. Similarly, 
financial payments can lead to an increase in the mark-up independent of whether they result 
from an increase in dividend or interest payments. However, changes in the corporate 
governance due to shareholder value maximisation are best captured by dividend rather than 
interest payments. The amount of dividend payouts are purely a decision of the firm and are 
therefore most closely related to changes in corporate governance. Furthermore, they are 
strongly correlated with share price rises and therefore directly linked to shareholder value 
maximisation. Interest payments, on the other hand, are only partly under the control of the 
firm and are not necessarily related to shareholder value maximisation.28 Lazonick (2014) 
argues that US firms increasingly distribute income to shareholder via share buybacks rather 
than dividend payouts. Furthermore, previous literature attributed the increasing relevance of 
shareholder value maximisation to changes in the remuneration structure of managers. It would 
be desirable to augment our estimations by a measure of share buybacks and a dummy for the 
link of CEO compensation and share prices. However, this data is not available.  
In a set of robustness tests, we also control for the impact of globalisation and concentration 
on the labour share. Note that globalisation has a dual character: First, via its impact on the 
structure of production it can alter the degree of capital intensity (Section 2.1). Second, it 
increases the relative bargaining power of capital (Section 2.2). Consequently, if globalisation 
has an impact on the wage share for a given capital-output ratio, this effect works via a change 
in relative bargaining power of capital vis-à-vis labour. We capture globalisation by including 
international operating income, measured as operating income generated from operations in 
foreign countries (before adjustments and eliminations), as a ratio to total operating income. It 
excludes exports and is closely related to a measure of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, it cannot capture intra-firm trade and offshore-outsourcing, which constitutes a very 
important dimension of globalisation.29 We capture concentration as either the Hirschman-
Herfindahl index or as the sales share of the four largest companies in the ISIC4 industry. 
However, the inclusion of market concentration into our empirical model does not allow us to 
                                                 
27 It would be desirable to include a measure of intangible assets or ICT capital. Thomson Reuters provides data 
on computer equipment. However, data availability is limited to few firms and its inclusion in our empirical 
analysis reduces the sample to less than 100 firms for the EU15 sample, which cannot be considered reliable.  
28 Kohler et al. (2018) measure the shareholder value channel by the stock market turnover ratio, defined as the 
total value of shares traded per year as a ratio to the average market capitalization. This measure is not available 
at the firm level. Furthermore, whether an increased turnover ratio actually has an impact on the behavior of 
managers is arguably better captured by variables that lie under the direct control of the firm, such as dividend 
payments. Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) suggest that firms took on debt in order to engage in share buybacks 
and make their balance sheets less attractive for takeovers, implying that increasing interest payments could also 
serve as a proxy for increasing shareholder value orientation. However, takeovers are rarely hostile, as firms found 
other means to protect themselves (Admati, 2017). Furthermore, since we lack data on share buybacks, interest 
payments seem a far-fetched proxy. For these reasons we consider dividend payments a much more direct measure 
of this channel. 
29 Intra-firm exports make up one third of global exports in 2015 (Lakatos and Ohnsorge, 2017).    
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test directly for the superstar firm hypothesis. According to the superstar firm hypothesis, the 
increase in concentration led to a decline in the labour share within superstar firms, while the 
labour share of other firms stagnated, or oven increased. Therefore, it is not clear whether we 
would expect a positive or negative impact of market concentration in our estimation. However, 
according to other contribution in line with the bargaining power hypothesis (Azar, et al., 2017; 
Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012; Kalecki, 1954), an increase in concentration would lead to an 
increase in the mark-up and consequently (and unambiguously) decrease the labour share 
within firms. It is the effect on the mark-up that we are controlling for by including 
concentration into our model.    
ߝ௜,௧ constitutes a composite error term with time-period and firm-specific components. The 
former is accounted for by the inclusion of year dummies, while the latter cancels out due to 
first-differencing. 
Technological change, as captured by capital intensity, is likely to be a function of past or 
current values of the labour share (Acemoglu, 2003; Cassetti, 2003; Bhaduri, 2006; Hein, 
2014). Similarly, a lower labour share, i.e. higher profit share, is likely to result in higher 
dividend payments. Accounting for simultaneity and reverse causality requires the use of 
instrumental variables. We use the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator introduced 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) and developed further by Blundell and Bond (1998) because it 
provides readily available ‘internal’ instruments based on lagged values of the explanatory 
variables. This also solves the problem of correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term in dynamic panel models (referred to as Nickell-bias; Nickell, 1981) and 
eliminates firm-specific but time constant unobservables by differencing the data in difference-
GMM and using lagged differenced variables as instruments in system-GMM. 
To arrive at our baseline specification we adopt an estimation strategy that starts with the most 
general specification and the most robust estimator (difference GMM) and work our way 
towards the most parsimonious model with the most efficient estimator (two-step system GMM 
with standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and Windmeijer, 2005, small sample error 
correction), following Kiviet, et al. (2015). We start with the estimation of a fairly unrestricted 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model including the contemporaneous and lagged 
value of all explanatory variables and a lagged dependent variable. This automatically restricts 
our sample to observations with at least three consecutive values of all variables. To assure that 
our test statistics are calculated for each firm, we further restrict our sample to firms with at 
least five consecutive years, as is common in the micro-econometric literature (e.g. Bond et al., 
2003).30 All estimations include year dummies to account for unobservable common shocks 
and mitigate cross-sectional dependence. We use all available lags as instruments in order to 
exclude the possibility that our results are driven by a particular choice of instrument lag length. 
Furthermore, we restrict our instrument set to one instrument column per variable (so-called 
collapsed instrument set) to limit the overall instrument count and mitigate the danger of 
instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009). We start by treating all variables as endogenous. 
Subsequently, we perform a ‘testing down’ procedure by dropping variable lags with the lowest 
                                                 
30 The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in the residuals of second order requires three estimated values per 
cross-section. Hence, the constraint to five consecutive years is a necessary evil, even though it leads to loss of 
data. Otherwise, not all cross-sections feed into the tests and the validity of the instruments cannot be assured. 
26 
 
absolute t-statistic, until we are left with at least one measure per variable. Thereafter, we test 
whether some of the variables can be treated as predetermined or exogenous by including one-
by-one more recent lags of the variable as an additional instrument and testing for its validity 
by applying the incremental Sargan-Hansen test (also referred to as difference-in-Hansen 
test).31 This procedure indicates that dividend payments can be treated as predetermined in the 
case of the United Kingdom, while the other variables are treated as endogenous. For other 
countries we treat all variables as endogenous. Only then do we move to the system-GMM 
estimator, which includes additional moment conditions that can be applied to the model 
estimated in level additional to estimations in differences. More precisely, while the difference-
GMM uses lagged level values as instruments for the estimation equation in differences, 
system-GMM additionally estimates the model in levels, using differenced lags of the variables 
as instruments. This improves efficiency, especially for estimations with variables that change 
slowly over time. However, the validity of the instruments used in the level equation relies on 
the assumption that the correlation between the explanatory variables and the firm-specific 
constant does not change over time. This is also referred to as the stationarity condition. The 
incremental Sargan-Hansen tests allows to test for this assumption by testing the validity of the 
instruments used in the level equation.32 Only if the incremental Sargan-Hansen test for the 
level equation is passed, we can rely on the results using the more efficient system-GMM, 
otherwise we resort to the difference-GMM estimator. Lastly, we provide estimations using the 
within-estimator for our baseline specification for comparison and as a robustness test.  
For our econometric analysis we exclude outliers from our database following usual procedures 
in the microeconometric literature, and especially previous papers using the Worldscope 
database.33 
 
4.2 Econometric results 
We start our econometric analysis with country-specific estimations for the largest EU15 
member states (France, Germany, the UK and Sweden) as well as a pool of all EU15 
members34. Ideally, we would conduct estimations for all member states individually. 
However, this is not possible due to data availability. The EU15 pool is our preferred alternative 
for several reasons. First, accounting standards are similar in the EU15 and therefore errors 
                                                 
31 The GMM estimator relies on the absence of autocorrelation in the residual (except of first order due to over-
differencing), as this would render lagged values of the explanatory variables invalid instruments. For this reason, 
it is important to account for a lagged dependent variable as well as to start the estimations based on a fairly 
general model that allows for lags of the explanatory variables. Additionally, it is particularly important to test for 
autocorrelation in the residuals. 
32 Most studies that apply the system-GMM estimator do not report the value of the incremental Sargan-Hansen 
test for the level equation, claiming the validity of their instruments based on the value of the overall Hansen test. 
This seems unfortunate, given the strong assumption underlying the validity for the level equation. 
33 More specifically we exclude observations with negative sales and negative or zero capital stock (e.g. also in 
Autor, et al. 2017; Hartman, et al., 2016). We exclude observations with negative value added as this would create 
negative labour shares which is not meaningful (this is also suggested by Vincent and Kehring, 2016). We also 
exclude observations where real sales or capital stock increased by over 200% as these are likely to constitute 
mergers (e.g. Bond, et al. 2003; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008). As is common in the literature, we winsorize all 
variables at the 1st and 99th percentile (e.g. Bond, et al. 2003). Lastly, we only include firms with five consecutive 
years for all variables for econometric reasons as outlined in Section 4.1. 
34 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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based on different measurement of items in the financial account are minimised. Second, it is 
a relatively homogenous group in terms of institutional settings, and therefore the pooling 
assumption is more likely to be justified. This is particularly important because our data comes 
from consolidated balance sheets. For example, institutional changes or global shocks that are 
captured by our time dummies are more likely to have the same effect across firms that operate 
in the same area. This helps our model to be better specified and can achieve instrument validity 
by reducing autocorrelation in the error term. Third, the EU15 is the economic zone that 
dominates our sample and is therefore likely to drive results for larger country pools. After a 
detailed analysis of the EU15 pool and individual member states we also present estimation 
results for a pool of advanced and emerging/ developing economies to test our hypotheses for 
a larger set of countries with different institutional settings.  
 
4.2.1 Estimations for the EU15 
Table 6 reports our baseline results for the UK, France, Germany, Sweden and the EU15 pool. 
The lag-structure is a result of the testing down procedure that is applied to each sample 
separately. We report estimation results using both system-GMM (the more efficient estimator) 
and difference-GMM (the more robust estimator).  
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Table 6: Baseline estimation results EU15 
 (1) France (2) UK (3) Germany (4) Sweden (5) EU15 
estimator type system-GMM 
period 1995-2016 
growth -0.393** -0.103 -0.267** -0.623** -0.247*** 
 (0.013) (0.196) (0.029) (0.011) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.221*** 0.014 0.046 0.117 0.081*** 
 (0.009) (0.716) (0.215) (0.157) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.184***    -0.020** 
 (0.001)    (0.019) 
financial income  -0.052  -0.024  
  (0.351)  (0.625)  
financial income(-1) 0.153*  0.028  0.005 
 (0.086)  (0.792)  (0.878) 
dividend payments 0.006 -0.034**  -0.014** -0.006** 
 (0.914) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.014) 
dividend payments(-1)   -0.027**   
   (0.035)   
interest payments    0.106*  
    (0.074)  
interest payments(-1) -0.057 -0.030* 0.009  0.020** 
 (0.249) (0.078) (0.846)  (0.032) 
wage share(-1) 0.509*** 0.289*** 0.182*** 0.141*** 0.225*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
constant 0.399*** 0.503*** 0.722*** 0.547*** 0.550*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (pval) 0.148 0.165 0.307 0.184 0.199 
diffHansen (pval) 0.033 0.022 0.422 0.632 0.184 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.149 0.350 0.670 0.995 0.583 
instruments 146 149 146 148 146 
number of firms 361 558 381 198 2272 
F-test 9.240 8.672 6.242 4.866 15.228 
Observations 4596 7771 4720 2135 29024 
F-test year dummies 0.774 0.000 0.008 0.866 0.155 
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Table 6, continued: Baseline estimation results EU15 
 (6) France (7) UK (8) Germany (9) Sweden (10) EU15 
estimator type difference-GMM 
period 1995-2016 
growth -0.359*** -0.240*** -0.148 -0.652** -0.251*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.153) (0.012) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.403*** 0.070** 0.107*** 0.123 0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.103) (0.003) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.129*    -0.015 
 (0.050)    (0.106) 
financial income  -0.089  -0.003  
  (0.352)  (0.946)  
financial income(-1) 0.120  0.032  0.011 
 (0.303)  (0.758)  (0.669) 
dividend payments -0.103* -0.049***  -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.067) (0.006)  (0.225) (0.116) 
dividend payments(-1)   -0.012   
   (0.592)   
interest payments    0.041  
    (0.515)  
interest payments(-1) -0.181** -0.035* 0.050  0.010 
 (0.042) (0.064) (0.442)  (0.322) 
wage share(-1) 0.245*** 0.251*** 0.157*** 0.101*** 0.202*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) 
wage share(-2) -0.058     
 (0.138)     
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen test (pval) 0.318 0.220 0.386 0.232 0.338 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.001 
AR2 test (pval) 0.489 0.333 0.835 0.861 0.750 
instruments 138 142 139 141 139 
number of firms 361 558 381 198 2272 
F-test 7.130 7.808 5.785 3.060 17.414 
Observations 3845 7162 4274 1913 26455 
F-test year dummies 0.180 0.078 0.851 0.995 0.757 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. All estimations conducted for 1995-2016 period. ***, 
**, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test stands for the p-value 
of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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We find a negative impact of dividend payments in all countries. The variable is significant at 
the 5%-level, except for France, where it is significant at the 10%-level only (specification 6). 
Dividend payments increased between 16-5%-points in the countries in our sample. An increase 
in the dividend payments to capital stock ratio by 10%-points leads to a decrease in the labour 
share by 1%-point in France and 0.5%-points in the UK. We find a negative impact of interest 
payments in France and the UK, whereas the effect is insignificant in Germany and positive in 
Sweden and the EU15 pool. We interpret these findings as evidence for a negative effect of 
shareholder value orientation on the labour share that works via changes in corporate 
governance. The joint significance of interest and dividend payments in France and the UK can 
also be interpreted as evidence for the mark-up channel, whereas findings for the other 
countries cast doubt on the international validity of this mechanism. Financial income has no 
statistically significant negative effect in any of our specifications. This suggests that the 
increase in fall-back options as captured by financial profits did not contribute to a decline in 
the labour share. 
With respect to our control variables, we consistently find a negative impact of growth, which 
confirms the counter-cyclical dynamics of the labour share. Capital intensity has a positive sign 
in Germany, Sweden and the UK, albeit being statistically significant only for the latter 
country. For France and the EU15 pool it shows alternating signs for the contemporaneous 
value and the first lag, with an overall positive long-run coefficient. This can be interpreted as 
evidence for an elasticity of substitution smaller than or equal to one in all countries. 
Considering our evidence from Figure 3 this suggests that labour share decreased not because 
of an increase, but rather a decrease in capital intensity. 
Besides the estimation results, the table reports a set of statistics that allow to evaluate our 
model. Tests for autocorrelation of first and second order (AR1 and AR2 test) suggest that our 
model is dynamically complete, with autocorrelation of first order (due to over-differencing) 
and no autocorrelation of second order. This is a precondition for using the lagged values of 
our explanatory variables as instruments. The results of the overall Hansen tests do not reject 
the hypothesis of instrument validity, and the relatively low values provide evidence that the 
test is not driven by instrument proliferation. The same qualitative results are obtained for the 
incremental Sargan-Hansen (diffHansen) test on the instruments for the estimation equation in 
levels for Germany, Sweden and the EU15 pool. The incremental Sargan-Hansen test on the 
instruments used in the level equation are not passed in the case of France and the UK, which 
is why the interpretation of estimation results are based on the difference-GMM estimator for 
these two countries. While the results are very robust across system- and difference-GMM in 
the case of the UK, dividend payments become insignificant for France when the system-GMM 
estimator is used.  
We present several robustness tests. Estimations in Table 6 might suffer from an omitted 
variable bias given that we lack direct measures of bargaining power such as union density or 
strike intensity at the firm level. As a first step, we include union density at the industry level 
as an additional control variable. Data for union density is based on Visser (2015) and only 
available at an aggregated industry level and not available for each year. Therefore, we linearly 
interpolate the series between available years and extrapolate using the growth rate of data 
available for the next higher level of aggregation. For example, we extrapolate data for 
individual manufacturing sectors using the growth rate of the total manufacturing union density 
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or country-level union density when the former series was not available.35 Nevertheless, sector-
level measures of these variables can only serve as proxies, since our firms conduct a large 
share of their production process outside their country of residence. The variable will be 
relevant only if the multinational corporations transfer the home country industrial relations 
culture to their foreign subsidiaries. A second robustness test is conducted by including an 
industry specific trend into our model. This captures, on the one hand, changes in bargaining 
power at the sectoral level, as well changes in other sector-level variables such as 
concentration. It can also capture measures of capital that are not available in our dataset, such 
as intangible or ICT capital. We chose an industry classification that is equivalent to a 2-digit 
ISIC4 classification for manufacturing and a 1-digit ISIC4 classification for services, resulting 
in up to 21 sectors per country. Arguably, this generic trend has advantages over concentration 
as captured by our data, as the latter excludes non-listed firms and therefore cannot account for 
changes in concentration between listed and non-listed companies. Table 7 reports the results. 
                                                 
35 One exception is Germany where industry specific union density data ends in 1997. Therefore, we use union 
density measured at the national rather than industry level for Germany. 
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Table 7: Robustness tests – union density and sector-specific trends  
(1) France (2) France (3) UK (4) UK (5) Germany (6) Germany 
estimator type system-GMM 
period 1995-2016 
growth -0.354*** -0.410** -0.068 -0.132* -0.318** -0.289**  
(0.003) (0.011) (0.341) (0.075) (0.012) (0.020) 
capital intensity 0.107 0.177** 0.002 0.008 0.061* 0.050  
(0.236) (0.022) (0.948) (0.790) (0.097) (0.104) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.115* -0.159***      
(0.061) (0.002)     
financial income   -0.044 -0.049      (0.490) (0.396)   
financial income(-1) 0.118* 0.172*   0.084 0.063  
(0.077) (0.066)   (0.411) (0.536) 
dividend payments -0.011 -0.037 -0.031** -0.045***    
(0.788) (0.459) (0.024) (0.000)   
dividend payments(-1)     -0.039*** -0.032**      (0.008) (0.015) 
interest payments(-1) -0.027 -0.068 -0.038** -0.040*** -0.006 -0.002  
(0.509) (0.154) (0.019) (0.009) (0.883) (0.973) 
union density(-1) -0.002  -0.003**  0.005**   
(0.656)  (0.042)  (0.049)  
wage share(-1) 0.434*** 0.456*** 0.316*** 0.304*** 0.184*** 0.186***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
constant 0.499*** 0.463*** 0.569*** 0.503*** 0.565*** 0.724***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sector-specific trend No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Hansen test (pval) 0.344 0.026 0.416 0.151 0.178 0.392 
diffHansen (pval) 0.460 0.003 0.222 0.171 0.242 0.597 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.152 0.162 0.330 0.362 0.985 0.773 
instruments 132 165 136.000 167.000 132 165 
number of firms 354 354 539 539 372 372 
F-test 8.191 123.228 9.272 2408.052 6.316 26.323 
Observations 4288 4562 7197 7680 4418 4682 
F-test year dummies 0.714 0.698 0.161 0.221 0.607 0.035 
F-test trend  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 
  
33 
 
Table 7, continued: Robustness tests – union density and sector-specific trends  
(7) Sweden (8) Sweden (9) EU15 (10) EU15 
estimator type system-GMM 
period 1995-2016 
growth -0.835*** -0.752*** -0.285*** -0.238***  
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.137** 0.063 0.094*** 0.085***  
(0.049) (0.299) (0.000) (0.001) 
capital intensity(-1)   -0.026** -0.026***    (0.029) (0.007) 
financial income 0.006 -0.016    
(0.885) (0.713)   
financial income(-1)   0.012 0.014    (0.689) (0.620) 
dividend payments -0.016** -0.020*** -0.008** -0.007***  
(0.043) (0.003) (0.016) (0.010) 
interest payments 0.059 0.070    
(0.266) (0.207)   
interest payments(-1)   0.023** 0.024**    (0.049) (0.013) 
union density(-1) -0.004**  -0.000*   
(0.049)  (0.088)  
wage share(-1) 0.114*** 0.138*** 0.232*** 0.236***  
(0.008) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.925*** 0.616*** 0.553*** 0.546***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sector-specific trend No Yes No Yes 
Hansen test (pval) 0.536 0.554 0.161 0.045 
diffHansen (pval) 0.855 0.890 0.102 0.090 
AR1 test (pval) 0.051 0.040 0.001 0.001 
AR2 test (pval) 0.461 0.320 0.369 0.336 
instruments 128 166 132 165 
number of firms 185 185 2211 2211 
F-test 6.095 75.840 16.735 14.510 
Observations 1851 2068 26907 28727 
F-test year dummies 0.983 0.601 0.223 0.267 
F-test trend  0.000  0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the incremental Hansen test for the 
instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and 
second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies 
is the F-test on all variables and the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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The effect of dividend payments is robust across all specifications with the exception of France 
where it turns insignificant. This confirms the negative impact of shareholder value orientation 
on the labour share for the majority of countries. Interest payments have a robust impact on the 
labour share in the UK (negative) and the EU15 (positive), whereas the coefficient turns 
insignificant in France and Sweden. Financial income remains insignificant in the majority of 
estimations, with the exception of France where it is positive at the 10%-level. This casts 
further doubt on the hypothesis that an increase in fall-back options due to financial profits had 
a negative impact on the labour share.  
Turning to our control variables, we continue finding a robust negative impact of growth, while 
capital intensity is less robust and becomes statistically insignificant in several specifications. 
The (long-run) coefficient for capital intensity remains positive in all countries, suggesting an 
elasticity of substitution less than one.  
Union density is positive and statistically significant in Germany, while it has a negative impact 
in the UK, Sweden and the EU15 sample.36 The finding of a negative effect of union density is 
surprising, even though it is statistically significant at the 10%-level only. A potential reason 
for the negative effect of union density is that unions managed wage moderation or refrained 
from aggressive bargaining during the Great Recession in order to save jobs. Indeed, restricting 
the sample to the years prior to the Great Recession (2008) turns the coefficient for union 
density statistically insignificant and using the system-GMM estimator leads to positive effects 
in some cases as we will discuss below in more detail.37 It would require further country 
specific estimations to determine which countries drive the negative effect of union density for 
the whole sample. However, since we have no firm specific measure for bargaining power this 
is beyond the scope of this research.  
 
A battery of additional robustness tests for each sample is reported in Tables 8 to 11. First, we 
report estimations including union density and a sector specific trend using the difference-
GMM estimator (specifications 1-2 in Tables 8-11). This is particularly relevant for France, 
where the incremental Sargan-Hansen test is not passed for the specification including sector 
specific trends only (specification 2, Table 7). The difference-GMM version of specification 
(2) shows a statistically significant negative effect of interest payments, while the other results 
are robust. The remaining specifications in Table 7 pass the incremental Sargan-Hansen test on 
the instruments in level, so that we rely on the results obtained using the more efficient system-
GMM estimator as reported in Table 7. However, while results for financialisation variables 
are largely robust, results for union density show large variation across the two estimators. 
Specifically, the negative and significant coefficient for union density in the UK and the EU15 
pool turns positive, and for the UK statistically significant when the difference-GMM estimator 
is used. This puts further doubt on the reliability of this variable in a sample of consolidated 
firm-level data.  
                                                 
36 The negative effect in Sweden can also be related to the fact that it is part of the Ghent-system, a social security 
framework which sets union membership as a requirement for the access to unemployment benefits. This is one 
reason for the relatively high and stable union density in Sweden and may weaken the connection of this measure 
to bargaining power. Stockhammer (2009) obtains a negative effect of union density for Ghent countries in a 
macro panel estimation. 
37 Results available upon request. 
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Table 8: France – robustness tests  
(1) UD (2) TREND (3) BASE (4) BASE (5) FE (6) GLOB (7) GLOB 
Period 1995-2016 1995-2007 1995-2016 
growth -0.189** -0.255** -0.315*** -0.446*** -0.271*** -0.358** -0.226**  
(0.044) (0.046) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.025) 
capital intensity 0.282*** 0.305*** 0.086 0.038 0.206*** 0.228*** 0.239***  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.246) (0.464) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.112** -0.142**   -0.136*** -0.089 -0.158*  
(0.036) (0.013)   (0.000) (0.127) (0.068) 
financial income(-1) 0.109 0.168* 0.106 0.098 0.030 -0.175 0.057  
(0.169) (0.071) (0.341) (0.286) (0.577) (0.418) (0.583) 
dividend payments -0.058 -0.075 0.042 0.048 -0.056*** -0.108 -0.050  
(0.531) (0.188) (0.573) (0.491) (0.000) (0.210) (0.382) 
interest payments(-1) -0.090 -0.146* -0.107 -0.074 -0.055 0.011 -0.060  
(0.246) (0.060) (0.316) (0.379) (0.117) (0.953) (0.574) 
union density(-1) 0.046        
(0.129)       
international OPI      -0.017 -0.033*       (0.146) (0.052) 
wage share(-1) 0.312*** 0.328*** 0.309*** 0.467*** 0.351*** 0.347** 0.584***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.002) 
wage share(-2)     -0.073**        (0.039)   
constant    0.461*** 0.626***  0.201     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.182) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.556 0.162 0.383 0.196  1.000 1.000 
diffHansen (pval)    0.207   0.988 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002  0.066 0.050 
AR2 test (pval) 0.059 0.066 0.236 0.421  0.067 0.115 
instruments 125 158 76 83  156 164 
number of firms 354 354 259 259 361 101 101 
F-test 7.210 443.200 5.167 7.089 15.601 6.251 8.987 
Observations 3876 4147 1903 2181 4260 821 961 
F-test year dummies 0.976 0.952 0.010 0.035  0.497 0.426 
F-test trend  0.000      
  Draft 01.02.2018 
36 
 
Table 8: France – robustness tests, continued 
 (8) HERFIN (9) HERFIN (10) CR(4) (11) CR(4) (12) LOGS 
Period 1995-2016 
growth -0.283** -0.389*** -0.256*** -0.359*** -0.284** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) 
capital intensity 0.325*** 0.187*** 0.336*** 0.169*** 0.369*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.125** -0.172*** -0.152*** -0.169*** -0.398*** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) 0.151* 0.153* 0.146* 0.156* 0.066 
 (0.073) (0.091) (0.069) (0.072) (0.283) 
dividend payments -0.080 0.000 -0.055 -0.007 -0.080 
 (0.198) (0.997) (0.379) (0.866) (0.102) 
interest payments(-1) -0.138* -0.063 -0.134* -0.061 -0.082* 
 (0.078) (0.178) (0.089) (0.198) (0.073) 
herfindahl index 0.605* -0.033    
 (0.065) (0.830)    
CR(4)   0.578 -0.234*  
   (0.206) (0.082)  
wage share(-1) 0.318*** 0.484*** 0.349*** 0.479*** 0.764*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wage share(-2)      
      
constant  0.458***  0.662*** -0.022 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.290) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.330 0.119 0.452 0.091 0.152 
diffHansen (pval)  0.059  0.024 0.827 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
AR2 test (pval) 0.045 0.150 0.054 0.153 0.443 
instruments 159 167 159 167 146 
number of firms 361 361 361 361 361 
F-test 7.325 8.899 7.771 8.926 19.366 
Observations 4172 4596 4172 4596 4596 
F-test year dummies 0.675 0.961 0.815 0.981 0.562 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. Estimation period in second row. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table 9: The United Kingdom – robustness tests  
(1) UD (2) TREND (3) BASE (4) BASE (5) FE (6) GLOB (7) GLOB 
Period 1995-2016 1995-2007 1995-2016 
growth -0.212** -0.255*** 0.035 0.046 -0.239*** -0.245** -0.068  
(0.026) (0.007) (0.656) (0.460) (0.000) (0.032) (0.536) 
capital intensity 0.050 0.088** -0.030 -0.047 0.060*** 0.017 -0.023  
(0.101) (0.015) (0.437) (0.224) (0.007) (0.485) (0.480) 
financial income -0.026 -0.078 0.192 0.002 0.003 -0.016 -0.034  
(0.762) (0.381) (0.266) (0.961) (0.899) (0.829) (0.680) 
dividend payments -0.045** -0.050*** -0.040 -0.055** -0.019** -0.021 -0.042***  
(0.013) (0.002) (0.260) (0.013) (0.027) (0.405) (0.002) 
interest payments(-1) -0.039** -0.042** -0.068* -0.059 -0.031** -0.042 -0.018  
(0.013) (0.015) (0.094) (0.141) (0.021) (0.174) (0.361) 
union density(-1) 0.004**        
(0.034)       
international OPI      0.003 -0.012       (0.633) (0.219) 
wage share(-1) 0.270*** 0.233*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.270*** 0.243*** 0.243***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant    0.588*** 0.500***  0.565***     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.349 0.397 0.112 0.245  0.242 0.610 
diffHansen (pval)    0.509   0.124 
AR1 test (pval) 0.002 0.001 0.016 0.017  0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.312 0.301 0.335 0.340  0.109 0.062 
instruments 129 160 79 86  162 170 
number of firms 539 539 402 402 558 369 369 
F-test 7.396 17.104 8.050 9.017 11.725 4.771 6.262 
Observations 6614 7093 3445 3858 7771 3622 4189 
F-test year dummies 0.034 0.758 0.795 0.129  0.314 0.000 
F-test trend  0.000      
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Table 9: The United Kingdom – robustness tests, continued 
 (8) HERFIN (9) HERFIN (10) CR(4) (11) CR(4) (12) LOGS 
Period 1995-2016 
growth -0.244*** -0.118* -0.229** -0.102 -0.235*** 
 (0.005) (0.078) (0.014) (0.196) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.073** 0.011 0.082** 0.012 -0.010 
 (0.034) (0.737) (0.020) (0.701) (0.586) 
      
      
financial income -0.093 -0.063 -0.086 -0.058 -0.081* 
 (0.332) (0.326) (0.338) (0.369) (0.095) 
dividend payments -0.051*** -0.033** -0.050*** -0.033** -0.048*** 
 (0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) 
interest payments(-1) -0.031* -0.025 -0.033* -0.026 -0.011 
 (0.081) (0.112) (0.060) (0.109) (0.445) 
herfindahl index 0.069 0.197    
 (0.821) (0.518)    
CR(4)   0.174 0.036  
   (0.594) (0.739)  
wage share(-1) 0.254*** 0.314*** 0.254*** 0.320*** 0.488*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant  0.451***  0.459*** -0.182*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.218 0.168 0.250 0.206 0.442 
diffHansen (pval)  0.004  0.004 0.317 
AR1 test (pval) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.341 0.380 0.353 0.388 0.550 
instruments 162 170 162 170 149 
number of firms 558 558 558 558 558 
F-test 7.084 8.852 7.254 8.547 18.470 
Observations 7162 7771 7162 7771 7771 
F-test year dummies 0.210 0.007 0.133 0.019 0.160 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. Estimation period in second row. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table 10: Germany – robustness tests 
 (1) UD (2) TREND (3) BASE (4) BASE (5) FE (6) GLOB (7) GLOB 
period 1995-2016 1995-2007 1995-2016 
growth -0.256* -0.166 -0.110 -0.107 -0.304*** -0.079 -0.053 
 (0.062) (0.131) (0.411) (0.452) (0.000) (0.498) (0.745) 
capital intensity 0.094*** 0.104*** 0.109*** 0.048 0.134*** 0.045 0.029 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.291) (0.000) (0.192) (0.275) 
financial income(-1) 0.240** 0.046 0.534 0.233 0.100 0.125 -0.034 
 (0.025) (0.696) (0.118) (0.344) (0.134) (0.389) (0.668) 
dividend payments(-1) -0.035 -0.013 -0.042 -0.080** -0.009 0.038 -0.070* 
 (0.108) (0.584) (0.308) (0.039) (0.180) (0.548) (0.064) 
interest payments(-1) 0.069 0.065 0.050 0.254 -0.045 0.197* 0.161 
 (0.475) (0.328) (0.814) (0.269) (0.256) (0.091) (0.490) 
union density(-1) 0.003       
 (0.482)       
international OPI(-1)      0.007*** 0.007*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
wage share(-1) 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.163** 0.189** 0.198*** 0.233*** 0.336*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.025) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant    0.695*** 0.644***  0.492*** 
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.105 0.496 0.151 0.165  1.000 1.000 
diffHansen (pval)    0.369   0.988 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004  0.021 0.019 
AR2 test (pval) 0.920 0.991 0.756 0.991  0.730 0.673 
instruments 125 158 76 83  153 161 
number of firms 372 372 270 270 381 93 93 
F-test 6.564 4.835 7.935 7.447 15.364 5.891 7.834 
Observations 3987 4246 1925 2213 4720 711 849 
F-test year dummies 0.610 0.156 0.000 0.001  0.379 0.227 
F-test trend  0.654      
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Table 10: Germany – robustness tests, continued  
(8) HERFIN (9) HERFIN (10) CR(4) (11) CR(4) (12) LOGS 
period 1995-2016 
growth -0.142 -0.274** -0.134 -0.276*** -0.466***  
(0.181) (0.018) (0.204) (0.009) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.099*** 0.038 0.104*** 0.036 -0.018  
(0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.288) (0.571) 
financial income(-1) 0.076 0.057 0.049 0.030 -0.003  
(0.479) (0.628) (0.693) (0.799) (0.957) 
dividend payments(-1) -0.010 -0.025** -0.016 -0.026** -0.017  
(0.630) (0.044) (0.422) (0.038) (0.259) 
interest payments(-1) 0.050 -0.003 0.043 0.004 -0.050  
(0.412) (0.929) (0.519) (0.932) (0.213) 
herfindahl index -0.288 0.008     
(0.338) (0.982)    
CR(4)   0.082 0.110     (0.761) (0.520)  
wage share(-1) 0.156*** 0.207*** 0.155*** 0.226*** 0.592***  
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant  0.710***  0.611*** -0.019   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.317) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.401 0.380 0.590 0.452 0.673 
diffHansen (pval)  0.309  0.314 0.786 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.826 0.754 0.809 0.826 0.777 
instruments 159 167 159 167 146 
number of firms 381 381 381 381 381 
F-test 5.838 6.323 5.046 7.023 15.376 
Observations 4274 4720 4274 4720 4720 
F-test year dummies 0.405 0.391 0.989 0.002 0.007 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. Estimation period in second row. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies.  
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Table 11: EU15 – robustness tests  
(1) UD (2) TREND (3) BASE (4) BASE (5) FE (6) GLOB (7) GLOB 
Period 1995-2016 1995-2007 1995-2016 
growth -0.268*** -0.264*** 0.105 -0.008 -0.321*** -0.319*** -0.328***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.270) (0.914) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) 
capital intensity 0.084*** 0.070*** 0.116*** 0.076** 0.102*** 0.058** 0.047**  
(0.005) (0.006) (0.001) (0.023) (0.000) (0.011) (0.040) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.019 -0.013 -0.054*** -0.037** -0.033*** -0.006 -0.003  
(0.119) (0.135) (0.003) (0.043) (0.000) (0.574) (0.794) 
financial income(-1) 0.012 0.012 0.272** 0.044 0.012 0.035 -0.002  
(0.650) (0.663) (0.016) (0.478) (0.566) (0.216) (0.926) 
dividend payments -0.005* -0.004* -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.013  
(0.083) (0.099) (0.975) (0.204) (0.354) (0.700) (0.350) 
interest payments(-1) 0.008 0.009 0.001 0.009 -0.008 -0.051 -0.020  
(0.463) (0.344) (0.880) (0.396) (0.398) (0.224) (0.162) 
union density(-1) 0.002        
(0.299)       
international OPI      -0.011 -0.015       (0.283) (0.177) 
wage share(-1) 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.272*** 0.292*** 0.217*** 0.101 0.096  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.298) (0.272) 
constant    0.503*** 0.581***  0.619***     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.376 0.232 0.740 0.046  0.605 0.255 
diffHansen (pval)    0.001   0.043 
AR1 test (pval) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000  0.008 0.011 
AR2 test (pval) 0.613 0.509 0.792 0.874  0.166 0.178 
instruments 125 158 76 83  159 167 
number of firms 2211 2211 1552 1552 2272 776 776 
F-test 18.564 12.062 16.218 18.079 28.687 4.877 5.891 
Observations 24430 26228 12042 13672 29024 6801 7943 
F-test year dummies 0.343 0.436 0.973 0.597  0.844 0.044 
F-test trend  0.004      
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Table 11: EU15 – robustness tests, continued 
 (8) HERFIN (9) HERFIN (10) CR(4) (11) CR(4) (12) LOGS 
Period 1995-2016 
growth -0.213*** -0.194*** -0.256*** -0.232*** -0.262*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.096*** 0.234*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.016* -0.021** -0.014 -0.025** -0.208*** 
 (0.076) (0.032) (0.121) (0.017) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) 0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.000 -0.048 
 (0.808) (0.962) (0.801) (0.991) (0.134) 
dividend payments -0.004 -0.006** -0.004 -0.007** -0.007* 
 (0.119) (0.013) (0.144) (0.019) (0.064) 
interest payments(-1) 0.009 0.019** 0.009 0.022** 0.001 
 (0.333) (0.032) (0.396) (0.036) (0.930) 
herfindahl index -0.027 0.077    
 (0.880) (0.734)    
CR(4)   0.102 0.783***  
   (0.640) (0.000)  
wage share(-1) 0.195*** 0.225*** 0.192*** 0.227*** 0.585*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant  0.548***  0.163 -0.092*** 
  (0.000)  (0.102) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.339 0.027 0.151 0.015 0.012 
diffHansen (pval)  0.001  0.003 0.001 
AR1 test (pval) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.804 0.562 0.851 0.555 0.009 
instruments 159 167 159 167 146 
number of firms 2272 2272 2272 2272 2272 
F-test 17.645 15.095 17.737 17.721 53.323 
Observations 26455 29024 26455 29024 29024 
F-test year dummies 0.430 0.153 0.878 0.548 0.244 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. Estimation period in second row.  ***, **, * denote 
statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the 
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Next, we restrict our sample to the years prior to the Great Recession (specifications 3-4 in 
Tables 8-11). We pass the incremental Sargan-Hansen test for all countries except the EU15 
pool, where we have to rely on the difference-GMM specification. The coefficient for dividend 
payments remains negative in all countries except France, although it turns insignificant in the 
EU15 sample. In France, it switches the sign while being, however, statistically insignificant.  
Our next robustness test estimates our baseline specifications (Table 6) using the within-
estimator (specification 5, Tables 8-11). Our baseline results are generally confirmed, with 
negative coefficients for dividend payments, which are, however, statistically significant only 
for France and Germany. Yet, we consider the within-estimator unreliable due to simultaneity 
bias for our explanatory variables, and the dynamic panel bias (Nickell bias) due to the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.  
The next robustness tests consider different model specifications. First, we control for measures 
of globalisation by including international operating income as a ratio to total operating income 
into the regression. This variable is closely related to a measure of FDI (specifications 6-7 in 
Tables 8-11). However, data availability is limited, reducing our total number of firms by up 
to two thirds of the initial sample, and making comparison to our baseline specification 
difficult. Results indicate a negative impact of international operating income in France and 
insignificant coefficients in the UK and the EU15, while the effect is positive in Germany. 
Dividend payments turn insignificant in France and the EU15, while remaining negative in the 
UK and Germany. While this casts further doubt on the robustness of the effect of 
financialisation in France, the other results seem robust: the coefficient for international 
operating income is insignificant for the UK and the EU15, which suggest that it can be 
excluded from the model, thereby bringing us back to the baseline estimation in Table 6. The 
effect of international operating income is statistically significant only in Germany, and the 
effect of dividend payments remains negative and statistically significant. Note that the Hansen 
tests are inflated in these specifications due to the large number of instruments in comparison 
with the cross sections, which results in p-values close to one.  
Next, we control for sales concentration (specifications 8-11 in Tables 8-11). We consider two 
measures, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index which captures overall concentration and the sales 
share of the largest four firms (CR4), both measured at the ISIC 2-digit level and calculated 
based on Worldscope data. As outlined in Section 3, this variable captures international market 
concentration among publicly listed firms. Our results confirm the intuition from our 
descriptive statistics, suggesting that concentration is not a main driver of the decline in the 
labour share in Europe. Both variables are rarely significant. The only exceptions are 
estimations for the EU15 sample using the CR4 measure. However, it has a positive coefficient, 
and renders the Hansen tests insignificant –potentially a sign of misspecification, which casts 
doubt on the reliability of the results. The negative effect of dividend payments remains robust 
to the inclusion of concentration in all countries. 
The last robustness test (specification 12 in Tables 8-11) controls for a different functional 
form. The log-linearization of a constant elasticities of substitution production function would 
suggest a relation between log capital intensity and the log labour share rather than their levels. 
Consequently, we re-estimate our baseline specification, taking the natural logarithm of the 
labour share and capital intensity. The other variables are left in levels, as they constitute shift 
factors between the labour share and the capital-output ratio (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2003; 
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Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014). Results show neither changes in the sign nor the statistical 
significance of capital intensity in all countries, and thereby confirm our finding of an elasticity 
of substitution smaller than or equal to one. Dividend payments remain statistically significant 
for the UK and the EU15 in this specification, while interest payments but not dividend 
payments remain significant in France. Dividend payments turn borderline insignificant for 
Germany and Sweden, while remaining negative. However, we prefer the baseline 
specification where all our variables are taken in ratios, as taking logs suggest misspecification 
for the EU15 pool.  
 
Summary of results for EU 15 
Summing up, our results indicate a negative impact of dividend payments on the labour share 
in all samples. The effect is particularly robust in the UK, Germany and the EU15 pool, while 
there is much weaker evidence for France. We also find some evidence for Sweden, although 
the results can only be seen as indicative due to the relatively small sample size. This finding 
is in line with the shareholder value channel that posits that increased shareholder value 
orientation of managers had negative consequences for labour, potentially due to wage 
suppression. This confirms previous findings from macro-panel analyses that found a negative 
impact of net financial payments (Kohler, et al., 2018) and net dividend payments (Dünhaupt, 
2016). This paper is the first study to confirm this effect at the firm level and demonstrate that 
it holds across countries with different institutional settings.  
There is evidence for a negative impact of interest payments in France and the UK, while the 
effect is insignificant or positive in other countries and the EU15 pool. The negative finding 
for France confirms previous findings by Alvarez (2015). However, the overall lack of 
robustness casts some doubt on the mark-up channel which argues that increasing financial 
overhead costs resulted in higher mark-ups and a decline in the labour share. Several macro-
panel studies also found a positive impact of interest payments on the wage share, although 
this has generally not been interpreted as evidence against the mark-up channel (Jayadev, 2007; 
Stockhammer, 2009; Dünhaupt, 2016). If interest payments are a result of borrowing for 
investment in fixed capital rather than financial assets or share buybacks, they could be 
associated with an expansion of production, and have a positive impact on the labour share. It 
would be desirable to complement estimations with a measure of share buybacks to control for 
this effect. However, data availability does not permit to do so. In any case, the finding that the 
effect differs considerably across countries suggest caution when interpreting results based on 
country pools, like our EU15 pool or as has been done in previous studies. 
We cannot confirm the ‘fall-back options’ hypothesis that posits a negative relation between 
financial income and the labour share. Our measure of financial income is largely insignificant 
and sometimes shows a positive, albeit not robust and significant, sign for France. This 
contradicts previous findings at the firm level for France (Alvarez, 2015) and at the sector-level 
for the US (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Furthermore, it is surprising given that 
international measures of financial fall-back options of capital, such as the sum of international 
assets and liabilities or an institutional index of financial openness, have been found to be 
strong predictors of the labour share in macro panel studies (IMF, 2017; Stockhammer, 2009, 
2017). One possible explanation is that de-jure financial deregulation is more important than 
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de-facto financial income at the firm level. This would be in line with political economy 
theories that argue that the threat of relocation of production, which gains credibility through 
deregulation of capital mobility, has a stronger distributional impact than the relocation itself 
(Burke and Epstein, 2002). The major institutional changes setting the path for financial 
globalisation are concluded by the mid-1990s, which could be a reason for the lack of 
significance in our sample period. Furthermore, the effect might be driven by non-listed rather 
than listed companies that were already integrated in financial markets much earlier than non-
listed firms. This implies that the increase in fall-back options of firms loses its impact in the 
medium-run. Indeed, Kohler, et al. (2018) estimate an error-correction model for a sample of 
14 OECD countries with data going back to 1990 and find that an institutional index for 
financial openness, which they use as a proxy for increasing fall-back options of capital, 
exhibits short-run but no long-run effects on the labour share. Overall, taking our results by 
face value suggests that the ability to generate profits through financial activities does not 
impact on the labour share. Furthermore, we find a positive, but not robust effect of financial 
income in France. This would be in line with the argument that increased income of the firm 
increases the likelihood of employers becoming more likely to accommodate bargaining 
outcomes that are more favourable for labour, independent of the source of income.  
In terms of our control variables, we find a robust negative impact of effective demand as 
captured by growth. This is in line with the evidence from macro data that profits decline faster 
during economic downturns than wages. More economically interesting is the positive or 
insignificant impact of capital intensity. These findings suggest an elasticity of substitution 
smaller than or equal to one for all countries. Interestingly, in combination with the declining 
capital intensity observed in the majority of countries in our sample, this implies that a lack, 
rather than a surge in capital deepening contributed to a decline in the labour share. In general, 
it casts doubt on the hypothesis of capital augmenting technological change as an explanation 
for the decline in the labour share. While data availability does not allow to account for ICT 
capital or intangible assets, our results are robust to the inclusion of sector specific trends that 
can partly account for changes in capital composition or technological progress. We were not 
able to confirm a negative impact of globalisation or concentration on the labour share. 
However, arguably, our test of these hypotheses was affected by a lack of data. Measures of 
globalisation were only available for a small share of our sample and cannot capture intra-
company trade or offshoring. Our variables is closest to a measure of FDI, which produced 
mixed results in previous studies, and for which the effect depends strongly on whether it has 
a market- or cost-seeking character (Onaran, 2012). Therefore, our finding of a largely 
insignificant effect of globalisation must be interpreted with caution. Similar considerations 
apply to our test of the effect of concentration. Our measure captures concentration among 
publicly listed firms in international rather than domestic markets. Using this measure, we find 
no significant effect of changes in concentration on the labour share, while variables accounting 
for financialisation remain robust. This suggest that changes in market concentration were not 
behind the increase in the mark-up and changes in the labour share. Similarly, the general trend 
of declining concentration in Europe and the lack of correlation between the labour share and 
different concentration measures at the industry level suggest no empirical evidence for the 
superstar firm hypothesis in the EU15, as outlined in Section 3. 
 
  Draft 01.02.2018 
46 
 
 
4.2.2 Estimations for the pool of advanced economies 
Our finding of a negative impact of shareholder value orientation in Europe suggest that we 
should test whether the effect holds for a wider set of institutionally more divers countries. 
Country-specific estimations would be the preferred option, which is, however, not feasible 
due to insufficient data for individual countries. Consequently, we continue by estimating our 
model with data for a pool of advanced economies.38 Table 12 reports the results. The lag- 
structure is a result of the testing down procedure described in Section 4.1 and we report 
estimation results using both system-GMM (the more efficient estimator) and difference-GMM 
(the more robust estimator).  
                                                 
38 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Table 12: Estimation results for all advanced economies  
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
for all instruments. diffHansen reports the p-values of the incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the 
level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order 
in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of 
the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period 1995-2016 
growth -0.204*** -0.258*** -0.219*** -0.249*** -0.206*** -0.222***  
(0.010) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) 
capital intensity 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.078** 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.096***  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.021** -0.027*** -0.017 -0.026** -0.020** -0.030***  
(0.027) (0.004) (0.104) (0.015) (0.033) (0.001) 
financial income(-1) 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.029 0.026 0.026  
(0.377) (0.487) (0.364) (0.354) (0.364) (0.357) 
dividend payments -0.008 -0.008** -0.008 -0.009** -0.007* -0.007**  
(0.108) (0.022) (0.128) (0.025) (0.098) (0.025) 
interest payments(-1) 0.025 0.025* 0.020 0.029* 0.025 0.029**  
(0.192) (0.060) (0.259) (0.052) (0.177) (0.039) 
union density(-1) 
  
0.001 -0.000* 
  
   
(0.424) (0.063) 
  
wage share(-1) 0.200*** 0.218*** 0.187*** 0.217*** 0.197*** 0.224***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 
 
0.534*** 
 
0.542*** 
 
0.540***   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sector-specific trend No No No No Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.094 0.037 0.088 0.064 0.064 0.010 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.183 
 
0.063 
 
0.043 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.485 0.384 0.676 0.412 0.421 0.280 
instruments 139 146 125 132 158 165 
number of firms 2855 2855 2653 2653 2653 2653 
F-test 20.241 18.279 19.368 18.794 14.438 15.496 
Observations 31442 34652 28278 31233 30709 33700 
F-test year dummies 0.740 0.744 0.315 0.379 0.227 0.170 
F-test trend 
    
0.007 0.000 
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Dividend payments have a negative impact on the labour share in all specifications. The 
variable is statistically significant in four out of six specifications, and borderline insignificant 
(with p-values 0.11 and 0.13) in the other two. Interest payments, however, have a positive 
effect which is statistically significant in three specifications. The effect of financial income is 
never statistically different from zero. Turning to our control variables, we find a negative 
impact of growth, which confirms the counter-cyclical dynamics of the labour share. Capital 
intensity shows alternating signs for the contemporaneous value and the first lag, with an 
overall positive long-run coefficient in all countries. However, test statistics suggest our model 
might be misspecified. Specifically, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the 
null-hypothesis of instrument validity in three specifications and shows value just marginally 
under 0.1 in the others. In other words, results in Table 12 are not reliable because they might 
suffer from an endogeneity bias.  
 
Additional robustness tests: advanced economies 
Several robustness tests are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. Specifications (1) and (2) 
report baseline results for a sub-sample ending in 2007. The Great Recession is characterised 
by large drops in output and productivity and only a slow recovery, which could constitute an 
outlier with respect to the long-run relations of the variables of interest. Therefore, it is 
important to control for the time consistency of our parameters of interest before and after 
2007. We find that dividend payments continue having a negative impact on the labour share, 
although the coefficient turns insignificant. The coefficient for interest payments is still 
insignificant, while financial income has a positive impact in specification (1) using difference-
GMM (the (incremental) Hansen test for the system-GMM specification 2 is not passed 
rendering these results unreliable). Next, in specification (3), we estimate our model using the 
within-estimator, i.e. not controlling for endogeneity. Results are similar to the baseline 
estimation using difference-GMM, with mainly capital intensity and growth being significant.  
Specifications (4-9) control additionally for globalisation and concentration in our model. 
Globalisation shows the expected negative sign, while being statistically insignificant. Our two 
measures of concentration, the Herfindahl and CR(4) index are both statistically insignificant 
when the difference-GMM estimator is used, and results for the Hansen test suggest that 
estimations using the system-GMM estimator are unreliable.39 Lastly, we check the robustness 
of our estimations to differences in the functional form by estimating our baseline specification, 
taking the natural logarithm of the labour share and capital intensity. Results show a negative 
effect of dividend payments, while the coefficient for interest payments and financial income 
turns negative but remains statistically insignificant. However, the value of the overall Hansen 
test suggests that results are unreliable.  
 
Summing up, while we find some evidence for a negative impact of financialisation on the 
labour share, our results suffer from a lack of robustness across specifications, and test statistics 
indicate concern about potential misspecification and instrument validity. One potential 
                                                 
39 Arguably, concentration measures for such a diverse sample are very imprecise since they rely on the 
assumption that firm that are in the same sector also compete in the same market. While this is quite likely for a 
relatively closed trading area like the EU15, it is a much stronger assumption in a sample that includes the U.S., 
Canada and Japan. 
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explanation is that we pool countries with very different institutional settings. Country or sector 
specific trends within a country that are not accounted for by our variables can induce 
autocorrelation in the residuals and render our instruments invalid. For this reason, we prefer 
estimation results based on the EU15 sample as well as country-specific estimations for its 
largest member states individually.  
 
4.2.3 Estimations for the emerging/ developing economies pool 
Finally, we conduct estimations for a pool of emerging and developing economies.40 Again, 
country-specific estimations are not feasible due to insufficient data for individual countries. 
Results are reported in Table 13.  
                                                 
40 Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Vietnam, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey. 
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Table 13: Estimation results for emerging/ developing economies  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period 1995-2016 
growth -0.130 -0.473*** -0.091 -0.314*** -0.120 -0.375***  
(0.176) (0.000) (0.387) (0.002) (0.220) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.064*** 0.036*** 0.068*** 0.056*** 0.077*** 0.054***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.019***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) -0.065*** -0.063** 0.023 0.013 -0.028 -0.021  
(0.007) (0.038) (0.644) (0.744) (0.454) (0.522) 
dividend payments -0.025** -0.009* 0.024 -0.005 -0.014* -0.004  
(0.013) (0.054) (0.667) (0.711) (0.094) (0.434) 
interest payments(-1) 0.008 0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.007 0.005  
(0.406) (0.184) (0.847) (0.769) (0.666) (0.673) 
union density(-1) 
  
0.000 -0.002*** 
  
   
(0.733) (0.000) 
  
wage share(-1) 0.271*** 0.293*** 0.262*** 0.283*** 0.246*** 0.293***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 
 
0.258*** 
 
0.337*** 
 
0.194***   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sector-specific trend No No No No Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.726 0.019 0.261 0.032 0.855 0.185 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.000 
 
0.045 
 
0.000 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.635 0.102 0.995 0.547 0.566 0.083 
instruments 139 146 125 132 158 165 
number of firms 4911 4911 3053 3053 3053 3053 
F-test 28.355 24.391 16.510 22.683 14.590 22.087 
Observations 34721 40061 19455 22679 24528 27848 
F-test year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.562 0.344 0.158 0.094 
F-test trend 
    
0.171 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
for all instruments. diffHansen reports the p-values of the incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the 
level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order 
in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of 
the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Results for Table 13 confirm a negative impact of shareholder value orientation, captured by 
dividend payments for emerging/ developing economies. Dividend payments show the 
expected negative sign in all specifications except specification (3) where the coefficient is 
positive but insignificant. The variable is statistically significant in all specification using the 
difference-GMM estimator, which is our preferred estimator for this sample since the 
incremental Sargan-Hansen test on the instruments in the level equation is never passed, which 
suggests that estimations using system-GMM are not reliable. Furthermore, in specification (3) 
union density41 is insignificant, suggesting that it should be excluded, which would bring us 
back to the baselines specification (1) where dividend payments have a statistically significant 
negative impact. Overall, this confirms the relevance of shareholder value maximisation in 
explaining the decline in the labour share globally. While institutions differ significantly across 
countries, our results can be interpreted as evidence for changes in corporate governance that 
favour shareholders at the expense of workers globally. Interest payments are never statistically 
significant, and results show alternating signs across specifications. This casts further doubt on 
the mark-up channel. Interestingly, financial income has a negative impact on the labour share 
in emerging/ developing economies in most specifications. This is in contrast to estimations 
for advanced economies and suggests that increasing fall-back options for capital changed 
relative bargaining power and contributed to a decline in the labour share. One potential reason 
why this variable is significant for the emerging/ developing economies pool only, is that a 
large share of these countries only recently deregulated capital flows. It is plausible that the 
bargaining power effect of increased financial fall-back options is most effective shortly after 
deregulation and wears off in the long-run.  
Turning to our control variables, we confirm an overall positive long-run coefficient for capital 
intensity, suggesting that production is characterised by an elasticity of substitution smaller 
than one. This is in-line with our findings for advanced economies. The effect of demand, 
captured by growth is negative confirming our previous findings.  
 
Additional robustness test: emerging and developing economies 
Table A2 reports our robustness test for the pool of emerging/ developing economies. 
Specification (1) and (2) are based on a reduced sample ending in 2007. Interestingly, this 
changes our results substantially, with dividend payments turning statistically insignificant, 
while interest payments have a statistically significant negative impact on the labour share. 
Results for our control variables are robust and qualitatively in line with our baseline 
specification (Table 13).  
Specification (3) in Table A2 applies the within estimator. It confirms our previous results with 
respect to a negative impact of dividend payments, while interest payments have a statistically 
                                                 
41 Union density at the sector level is not available for emerging/ developing economies; hence 
we use union density at the country level. 
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significant positive impact which is surprising and not confirmed by other specifications, 
casting doubt on the reliability of this result.  
Specifications (4-9) include our measures of globalisation and concentration. Results from our 
baseline specification are largely confirmed for dividend payment and financial income as both 
variable show a negative, albeit largely statistically insignificant effect. However, measures of 
globalisation and concentration are also statistically insignificant, suggesting that nothing is 
gained by including them into the model and bringing us back the baseline specification in 
Table 13.  
Lastly, specification 10 in Table A2 re-estimates our baseline specification using the logarithm 
of the labour share and capital intensity. Results confirm a negative impact of financial income 
on the labour share, although the low value of the Hansen tests cast doubt on the reliability of 
the results and confirms that our baseline estimation without logs is preferable.  
 
Summing up, we found evidence for a negative impact of dividend payments in emerging/ 
developing economies. Interestingly, our results in Table 13 also suggest a negative impact of 
financial income on the labour share. This implies that financialisation is a global phenomenon 
which impacts different country groups differently. Specifically, while there is evidence for a 
negative impact of increased shareholder value orientation worldwide, the effect of increasing 
fall-back options of capital as captured by non-operating financial profits is particularly 
relevant in emerging/ developing economies. One potential reason is that emerging economies 
only recently became integrated in financial markets. This would imply that the impact of 
increasing fall-back options on the labour share is only effective shortly after countries open 
up to capital flows. It would also explain why we don’t find a significant effect for advanced 
economies. Furthermore, it is consistent with the finding of a short-run effect of financial fall-
back options in Kohler, et al. (2018), who use data for OECD countries that goes back to 1990, 
i.e. including several years when the deregulation of capital flows was taking place.  
Nevertheless, in general results for emerging/ developing economies are less robust than for 
the EU15 countries as indicated by the robustness tests in Table A2. Overall, there is indication 
that results strongly depend on the institutional setting. Therefore, results based on country 
pools with very different institutions can only produce indicative results and require a more 
detailed analysis based on smaller sub-pools. Unfortunately, country-specific analysis for 
emerging/ developing economies is not possible due to the relatively small number of publicly 
listed firms available for each country. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The decline in the labour share coincided with the permeation of economic processes by 
financial motives and activities. While there is a recent surge in the literature focusing on the 
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decline in the labour share, financialisation has not played a role in most studies. We contribute 
to the existing literature by analysing the effect of financialisation on the labour share of 
publicly listed firms in advanced and emerging economies and with a specific focus on the 
EU15, while also controlling for the effect of technological change and concentration. We 
investigate the effect of financialisation on the labour share via three channels: 1) increased 
shareholder value orientation and consequent wage suppression, 2) increased financial 
overhead costs and consequent increases in the mark-up, 3) increased fall-back options for 
capital due to a decoupling of profit generation from the core business. Previous studies based 
on country-level data used net financial payments to argue that financialisation had a negative 
impact on the labour share due to increasing financial overhead costs and subsequent increases 
in the mark-up (Alvarez, 2015; Dünhaupt, 2016). In contrast, we argue that dividend payments, 
interest payments and financial income capture different channels and thereby might have 
different effects. Our findings confirm this hypothesis: We find evidence of a negative effect 
of shareholder value orientation (captured by dividend payments) on the labour share in all 
countries, while the effect of increasing financial overhead costs (relying on a joint significance 
of dividend and interest payments) is mainly relevant for France and the UK. This suggests that 
changes in the balance of power and bargaining relations within firms rather than changes in 
the mark-up lie at the heart of the decline in the labour share. Furthermore, we find evidence 
for a negative impact of increased fall-back options of capital, as captured by financial income 
from dividends and interests. However, this effect is only statistically significant in emerging/ 
developing economies and insignificant in advanced countries. This contradicts previous 
findings at the firm level for France (Alvarez, 2015), at the sector-level for the U.S. (Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), and research using country-level data for advanced countries 
(Stockhammer, 2009, 2017). One potential reason for this finding is that increased fall-back 
options have a negative impact only shortly after a country opens up to capital flows. Since the 
majority of publicly listed firms in advance economies were already integrated in global 
financial markets by 1995, this channel is only effective for emerging and developing 
economies, where firms only relatively recently started speculating on global financial markets. 
Previous research (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2014; 
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014) highlighted the role of technological change for the decline 
in the labour share. This argument assumes an elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labour that is larger than one. In contrast, we consistently find evidence for an elasticity of 
substitution smaller than one, casting doubt on this hypothesis. This is in line with previous 
research that specifically estimates this elasticity (Chirinko and Mallick, 2014). The majority 
of studies using firm-level data to investigate the determinants of the labour share focus on the 
superstar firm hypothesis (Autor, et al., 2017). The gist of the argument is that wages did not 
stay behind productivity in the majority of firms, but only in a small share of very productive 
companies. In contrast, our results suggest that wages stayed behind productivity in very 
financialised firms, as revenues are increasingly channelled to shareholders rather than shared 
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with the workforce in line with their productivity. This is substantiated by our finding that 
concentration declined among publicly listed European firms, which casts doubt on the 
superstar firm hypothesis. 
Our findings have important policy implications. Appropriately designed taxation and 
corporate regulation can create incentives to decrease financial payments. This would not only 
encourage firms to invest in productive capacity rather than maximising shareholder value, but 
also improve income distribution. This could be achieved through higher taxation of dividend 
payments and capital gains, and by prohibiting share buybacks. Decoupling executives’ 
remuneration from share prices and including representatives of employees and the wider 
public on company boards would further support this process (Lazonick 2014). 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Advanced economies – robustness tests  
(1) BASE (2) BASE (3) FE (4) GLOB (5) GLOB 
Period 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 
growth 0.085 -0.017 -0.309*** -0.297*** -0.291**  
(0.334) (0.810) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) 
capital intensity 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.098*** 0.074*** 0.072***  
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.032*** -0.009 -0.008  
(0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.285) (0.396) 
financial income(-1) 0.271*** 0.068 0.032 0.022 0.021  
(0.009) (0.270) (0.228) (0.827) (0.791) 
dividend payments -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007 -0.025  
(0.874) (0.228) (0.640) (0.661) (0.247) 
interest payments(-1) 0.002 0.008 -0.014 0.023 -0.007  
(0.794) (0.422) (0.236) (0.780) (0.674) 
international OPI 
   
-0.004 -0.010     
(0.567) (0.402) 
wage share(-1) 0.270*** 0.296*** 0.217*** 0.095 0.091  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.290) (0.255) 
constant 
 
0.502*** 0.567*** 
 
0.591***   
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.619 0.034 
 
0.458 0.302 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.001 
  
0.127 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 
 
0.004 0.007 
AR2 test (pval) 0.818 0.893 
 
0.182 0.199 
instruments 76 83 
 
159 167 
number of firms 1790 1790 2855 1043 1043 
F-test 20.442 23.326 34.785 4.995 5.870 
Observations 13709 15583 34652 8643 10114 
F-test year dummies 0.873 0.270 
 
0.372 0.858 
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Tables A1, continued: Advanced economies – robustness tests  
(6) HERFIN (7) HERFIN (8) CR(4) (9) CR(4) (10) LOGS 
Period 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 
growth -0.221*** -0.259*** -0.209*** -0.252*** -0.276***  
(0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.095*** 0.230***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.022** -0.028*** -0.022** -0.028*** -0.205***  
(0.011) (0.001) (0.015) (0.003) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.026 -0.025  
(0.363) (0.369) (0.341) (0.325) (0.346) 
dividend payments -0.007 -0.008** -0.007 -0.007** -0.006*  
(0.102) (0.025) (0.101) (0.034) (0.077) 
interest payments(-1) 0.026 0.030** 0.025 0.030** -0.000  
(0.179) (0.038) (0.177) (0.039) (0.987) 
herfindahl index 0.193 0.702** 
   
 
(0.578) (0.044) 
   
CR(4) 
  
0.052 0.536*** 
 
   
(0.719) (0.000) 
 
wage share(-1) 0.190*** 0.221*** 0.193*** 0.231*** 0.605***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 
 
0.490*** 
 
0.345*** -0.088***   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.134 0.023 0.143 0.003 0.004 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.037 
 
0.000 0.346 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.465 0.289 0.441 0.250 0.017 
instruments 159 167 159 167 146 
number of firms 2653 2653 2653 2653 2855 
F-test 20.257 17.505 20.541 18.090 56.151 
Observations 30709 33700 30709 33700 34652 
F-test year dummies 0.780 0.630 0.724 0.129 0.336 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions for all instruments. Period denotes estimation period. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the 
incremental Hansen test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number 
of instruments used. F-test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and of the Wald test 
on the joint significance of all year dummies. 
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Table A2: Emerging/ developing economies – robustness tests 
Firm-level Wage Share (1) BASE (2) BASE (3) FE (4) GLOB (5) GLOB 
Period 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 
growth -0.285** -0.333*** -0.191*** -0.091 -0.167*  
(0.027) (0.006) (0.000) (0.203) (0.053) 
capital intensity 0.046*** 0.028** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.040***  
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015***  
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) 0.041 0.023 0.006 -0.053*** -0.047  
(0.541) (0.742) (0.596) (0.008) (0.158) 
dividend payments 0.034 -0.065 -0.004* -0.004 -0.010***  
(0.668) (0.353) (0.059) (0.810) (0.005) 
interest payments(-1) -0.218** -0.023 0.013*** 0.004 0.016  
(0.040) (0.740) (0.009) (0.548) (0.233) 
international OPI 
   
-0.010 -0.004     
(0.524) (0.551) 
wage share(-1) 0.397*** 0.417*** 0.244*** 0.265*** 0.311***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 
 
0.226*** 0.219*** 
 
0.191***   
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM within diff-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.423 0.276 
 
0.545 0.365 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.006 
  
0.018 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.657 0.471 
 
0.407 0.132 
instruments 76 83 
 
159 167 
number of firms 1275 1275 4911 2007 2007 
F-test 9.786 15.390 60.203 17.534 15.395 
Observations 6874 8192 40061 13038 15497 
F-test year dummies 0.047 0.000 
 
0.002 0.001 
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Table A2, continued: Emerging/ developing economies – robustness tests 
Firm-level Wage Share (6) HERFIN (7) HERFIN (8) CR(4) (9) CR(4) (10) LOGS 
Period 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 1995-2016 
growth -0.099 -0.298*** -0.073 -0.271*** -0.616***  
(0.269) (0.000) (0.395) (0.001) (0.000) 
capital intensity 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.075*** 0.052*** 0.332***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
capital intensity(-1) -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.264***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
financial income(-1) -0.029 -0.022 -0.024 -0.013 -0.126***  
(0.410) (0.475) (0.507) (0.633) (0.007) 
dividend payments -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 0.001  
(0.276) (0.148) (0.331) (0.200) (0.948) 
interest payments(-1) -0.006 0.002 -0.007 -0.003 0.019  
(0.712) (0.875) (0.643) (0.765) (0.364) 
herfindahl index 0.122 -0.052 
   
 
(0.308) (0.640) 
   
CR(4) 
  
0.030 -0.035 
 
   
(0.702) (0.657) 
 
wage share(-1) 0.249*** 0.294*** 0.249*** 0.299*** 0.630***  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 
 
0.196*** 
 
0.213*** -0.384***   
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
estimator type diff-GMM sys-GMM diff-GMM sys-GMM sys-GMM 
Hansen test (pval) 0.759 0.101 0.717 0.016 0.002 
diffHansen (pval) 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 0.001 
AR1 test (pval) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 test (pval) 0.466 0.067 0.490 0.063 0.400 
instruments 159 167 159 167 146 
number of firms 3053 3053 3053 3053 4911 
F-test 21.121 21.594 20.402 21.120 83.719 
Observations 24528 27848 24528 27848 40061 
F-test year dummies 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Notes: Dependent variable is the firm-level labour share. ***, **, * denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. Period denotes estimation period. Hansen test (pval) stands for the p-value of the Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions for all instruments. diffHansen (pval) reports the p-values of the incremental Hansen 
test for the instruments used in the level equation.  AR1 and AR2 is the p-value of the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation of first and second order in the residuals. Instruments denote the number of instruments used. F-
test and F-test year dummies is p-value of the F-test on all variables and on the joint significance of all year 
dummies. 
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Summary statistics42 
 
The United Kingdom 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 10237 0.661211 0.819014 -6.88333 7.329377 
growth 11430 0.08969 0.524099 -7.27733 7.994821 
capital intensity 10946 0.957166 2.67793 -28.0393 22.9107 
financial income 10940 0.249775 2.96587 -0.03522 219.0833 
dividend payments 12380 0.191549 0.447423 0 4.519702 
interest payments 12313 0.195386 0.648776 0 10.05263       
France 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 6467 0.805261 0.554023 -4.18587 4.737561 
growth 7962 0.07934 0.422759 -5.90807 9.870331 
capital intensity 6898 0.754885 1.237341 -4.30612 10.00899 
financial income 5813 0.118855 0.715449 -0.00364 20.98113 
dividend payments 7111 0.141212 0.32493 0 3.577778 
interest payments 7496 0.176575 0.362073 -0.07623 5.04       
Germany 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 6405 0.846096 0.77235 -5.06792 7.372857 
growth 7768 0.076312 0.527517 -9.85027 7.370213 
capital intensity 6732 1.043547 1.707805 -4.92821 16.30825 
financial income 6997 0.253737 4.418862 -0.01012 288.7746 
dividend payments 7257 0.146197 0.501264 0 8.624967 
interest payments 7934 0.201226 0.642234 0 12       
EU15 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 39632 0.756474 0.800039 -12.8412 20.14474 
growth 48021 0.069986 0.47581 -9.85027 9.870331 
capital intensity 41981 1.335747 3.928346 -174.347 105.1799 
financial income 42149 0.183939 2.476464 -0.95232 288.7746 
dividend payments 47039 0.24615 2.258407 -0.02564 141.4 
interest payments 49516 0.200527 0.843428 -0.07623 54.73214       
                                                 
42 Note that several of our variables are characterised by large outlier, which is typical for firm-level literature 
(Autor, et al. 2017). The outliers constitute only a minor part of the sample. For example, for the EU15 sample, 
labour shares above 3 make up only 1 percent of the sample. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that 
comparison of our labour share data with data based on National Accounts is problematic because 1) value added 
is net of depreciation, 2) we exclude a number of industries and 3) because we don’t not have information for non-
listed firms. 
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advanced economies 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 49214 0.721528 0.810939 -14.231 20.14474 
growth 99316 0.063662 0.441928 -9.85027 10.07194 
capital intensity 52274 1.278733 4.805752 -174.347 105.1799 
financial income 89057 0.178326 9.373008 -0.95232 2094.433 
dividend payments 100752 0.152035 1.555126 -0.02564 141.4 
interest payments 102804 0.186512 1.479506 -0.07623 94.64286       
emerging economies 
     
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
labour share 77034 0.46853 0.714579 -8.22456 11.48526 
growth 123525 0.060114 0.450607 -9.85467 14.96615 
capital intensity 81128 3.088817 8.522262 -350.465 215.0951 
financial income 98392 0.14415 3.70636 -10.0468 572.8461 
dividend payments 112349 0.124878 3.740539 -0.65283 1169.048 
interest payments 129835 0.129565 0.845666 -4.71915 58.42093 
 
 
 
 
